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METASTABLE EQUILIBRIA
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. We deﬁne a reﬁnement of Nash equilibria called metastability. This reﬁnement
supposes that the given game might be embedded within any global game that leaves its
local best-reply correspondence unaﬀected. A selected set of equilibria is metastable if it is
robust against perturbations of every such global game; viz., every suﬃciently small pertur-
bation of the best-reply correspondence of each global game has an equilibrium that projects
arbitrarily near the selected set. Metastability satisﬁes the standard decision-theoretic ax-
ioms obtained by Mertens’ (1989) reﬁnement (the strongest proposed reﬁnement), and it
satisﬁes the projection property in Mertens’ small-worlds axiom: a metastable set of a global
game projects to a metastable set of a local game. But the converse is slightly weaker than
Mertens’ decomposition property: a metastable set of a local game contains a metastable
set that is the projection of a metastable set of a global game. This is inevitable given our
demonstration that metastability is equivalent to a strong form of homotopic essentiality.
Mertens’ deﬁnition invokes homological essentiality whereas we derive homotopic essential-
ity from primitives (robustness for every embedding). We argue that this weak version of
decomposition has a natural game-theoretic interpretation.
1. Introduction
This article contributes to the reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite game. For a
critical review of equilibrium reﬁnements see Hillas and Kohlberg [9]. The initial sections
of Hillas, Jansen, Potters, and Vermuelen [8] review further those reﬁnements based on
perturbations of a game’s best-reply correspondence, which is the formulation adopted here.
We deﬁne a new reﬁnement called metastability. Our deﬁnition builds on those pro-
posed by Hillas [7] and variants studied by Hillas, Jansen, Potters, and Vermuelen [8].
However, metastability is a substantially stronger reﬁnement because we invoke a natu-
ral generalization—the Embedding Principle described below—of the Invariance and Small
Worlds axioms proposed by Kolhberg and Mertens [10] and Mertens [15].
Our main results establish that metastability satisﬁes the standard decision-theoretic ax-
ioms considered by Mertens [13, 14]. It also satisﬁes the projection property and a slightly
weaker version of the decomposition property—the two parts of Mertens’ [15] Small Worlds
axiom. Due to the latter, metastability is slightly weaker than the reﬁnements proposed by
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Mertens, but in a companion paper [5] we prove that metastability coincides with Mertens’
stability for generic extensive-form games. Mertens invokes homological essentiality as an
integral part of the deﬁnitions of his reﬁnements, whereas here we derive a strong form of
homotopic essentiality from our deﬁnition. As described below, the deﬁnition imposes two
basic requirements called Embedding and Robustness.
Brieﬂy (a precise deﬁnition is provided later):
A connected set of the equilibria of a game G is metastable if every neigh-
borhood contains the projection of an equilibrium for each suﬃciently small
perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of any global game ˜ G in which
G is embedded.
By an embedding we mean a trivial embedding in that the optimal strategies of players in
G are not aﬀected; that is, their best-reply correspondence is not aﬀected.
This deﬁnition invokes two principles.1
(1) Embedding. Any game G can be construed as a local version of a global game
˜ G with additional features that do not aﬀect optimal behavior in G. This principle
subsumes those axioms requiring that a reﬁnement is not aﬀected by extraneous
features:
² Small Worlds. The additional features could be actions of players in ˜ G who are
not players in G, provided their actions have no eﬀect on the optimal strategies
of players in G.
² Invariance. The additional features could be redundant strategies of players in
G, such as a pure strategy whose payoﬀs are replicated by some mixed strategy.
² Rationality. The additional features could be presentation eﬀects, behavioral
anomalies, or subjective beliefs that are not relevant for optimal play in G.
Metastability ensures that a selected set of equilibria of a global game ˜ G projects to
a selected set of equilibria of any embedded game G. As Mertens [15, p. 555] remarks
regarding the Small Worlds axiom:
“... such a property is essential if one wants to speak of a ‘solution concept.’
Indeed, otherwise one could never apply the ‘solution concept’ to a given
1The requirement that a metastable set is connected excludes the set of all equilibria, which trivially
satisﬁes (1) and (2). It also reﬂects the fact that all equilibria in a single connected component of the equilibria
of a generic extensive-form game have the same outcome (Kreps and Wilson [11]), and more fundamentally,
the fact that the uniformly hyperstable sets of Nash equilibria are necessarily connected since they are
precisely the essential sets of ﬁxed points of any map whose ﬁxed points are the Nash equilibria (Govindan
and Wilson [4]). Connectedness excludes the minimal stable sets studied by Kohlberg and Mertens [10]—
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game; one would ﬁrst have to embed this game in some ‘universal game’ of
everything going on in the world.”
(2) Robustness. Nearby global games should induce nearby equilibria of the local
game. Speciﬁcally, each neighborhood of a selected set should include the projection
of an equilibrium of a suﬃciently small perturbation of a global game in which G
is embedded. That is, global perturbations induce small perturbations of optimal
behavior in the local game.
We do not provide here a decision-theoretic justiﬁcation for Robustness, but in [6] we estab-
lish that two properties (one of which is Invariance) imply robustness with respect to pertur-
bations of strategies in the weaker reﬁnement called stability by Kohlberg and Mertens’ [10].
Although Robustness is a weak requirement, we show in x4 that in combination with
Embedding it is equivalent to a succinct mathematical test. This test is a strong form of
homotopic essentiality called stable essentiality. In technical terms, stable essentiality says
that the strategy set of the given game remains in the range of every homotopic deformation
of any suspension of the local projection map from the graph of equilibria to the space of
strategy perturbations. Although stable essentiality is weaker than the homological essen-
tiality invoked in Mertens’ deﬁnition, it suﬃces to assure that the same decision-theoretic
axioms are satisﬁed.
The fact that Embedding and Robustness imply stable essentiality has a precedent. In [4]
Invariance and robustness with respect to payoﬀ perturbations are shown to imply homolog-
ical essentiality; viz., a uniformly hyperstable set (Kohlberg and Mertens [10]) of equilibria is
an essential component of every map whose ﬁxed points are the Nash equilibria. In contrast,
Mertens [13] directly imposes essentiality in his deﬁnition of a stable set.
As one knows from Mertens’ work, essentiality of the projection map enables veriﬁcation
that decision-theoretic axioms are satisﬁed because it ensures that the ﬁxed-point problems
they pose have solutions. In x5 we establish the following properties:
² Admissibility, Perfection, and Backward Induction. A metastable set includes only
perfect (hence admissible) equilibria, and includes a proper equilibrium that induces
a sequential equilibrium in every extensive-form game with G as its strategic form.
² Iterative Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Never Weak Best Replies,
and Forward Induction. A subset of a metastable set survives iterative elimination
of weakly dominated strategies and strategies that are inferior replies at every equi-
librium in the set.
Additional properties include the axioms of Ordinality and Player-Splitting.4 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Metastability diﬀers from Mertens’ stability chieﬂy in that it satisﬁes a version of the
Small Worlds axiom that is weaker than the one proposed by Mertens. As stated above, it
satisﬁes the ﬁrst part of Mertens’ axiom.
Projection Property. A metastable set of a global game projects to a metastable
set of an embedded local game.
That is, if G is embedded in ˜ G and ˜ S is a metastable set for ˜ G then S ´ projG(˜ S) is
a metastable set for G. Mertens’ stability satisﬁes the Projection Property and also its
converse in the following strong form:
(1*) Each stable set of G is the projection of a stable set of each game in
which G is embedded.
(2*) If S is a stable set of G then for any stable set S0 of any other game G0
the product S £ S0 is a stable set of the product game G £ G0.
The Projection Property along with (1*) is the Small Worlds Property. The Projection
Property along with (2*) is the Decomposition Property. Metastability satisﬁes the following
weaker versions of (1*) and (2*).
(1) Each metastable set of G contains the projection of a metastable set of
each game in which G is embedded.
(2) If S is a metastable set of G then for any other game G0 there exists a
metastable set S0 of G0 such that S£S0 is a metastable set of the product
game G £ G0.
Thus (1) states that if S is a metastable set of G and G is embedded in ˜ G then there is a
metastable set ˜ S of ˜ G such that S ¶ projG(˜ S), where the Projection Property assures that
projG(˜ S) is itself a metastable set for G — and analogously in (2).
Our view is that these weaker versions are natural from a game-theoretic viewpoint. A
metastable set is intended to be a collection of possible outcomes that can be reﬁned further
only with additional information. For instance, in an extensive-form game the play oﬀ the
equilibrium path is typically indeterminate, but in speciﬁc contexts additional considerations
might lead to selection of (say) minimal or maximal ‘punishments’ for deviations from the
equilibrium path. Analogously, embedding a game in a particular global game provides
such a context that can select a metastable set (the projection of a metastable set of the
global game) that is a strict subset of another metastable set. The decomposition property
is thus seen as unduly strong when the product game G £ G0 allows correlated selections
of metastable sets for the two embedded games; i.e. correlated selections in the product
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Even so, these considerations are relevant only for non-generic extensive-form games, since
metastability agrees with Mertens’ stability for generic extensive-form games.
Our deﬁnition of metastability has two key aspects. One is that (as in Govindan and
Mertens [3]) we use the best-reply correspondence of a game as the primitive, rather than
a formulation in terms of payoﬀs. The second is that (as in Hillas [7] and Hillas, Jansen,
Potters, and Vermuelen [8]) we test for Robustness using perturbations of the best-reply
correspondence. The relevant mathematical tool is then homotopy theory rather than the
stronger homology theory invoked by Mertens [13] for perturbations of strategies.
The key step of our technical development is the demonstration that metastability (like
Mertens’ stability) of a connected set of equilibria is a property of its germ, i.e. its neighbor-
hood in the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over the space of strategy perturbations.
Theorem 4.2 characterizes metastability in terms of the property that the local projection
map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is stably essential in the sense of
homotopy theory. That is, as deﬁned in Appendix A’s Deﬁnition A.8, the map remains
essential when it is embedded in a space with extra dimensions—using the formal deﬁnition
of a ‘suspension’ from algebraic topology. (For the applications here, stably essential is the
same as essential when the dimensions of the domain and range are the same, but not when
the domain has higher dimension than the range.) This characterization is especially rele-
vant for our companion paper [5] on extensive-form games, since nearby points in the germ
(i.e., equilibria of nearby games) induce the beliefs that support sequential equilibria.
After the formulation and deﬁnition of metastability and related reﬁnements are estab-
lished in x2, technical aspects of the Robustness condition are established in x3. In particular,
x3.4 shows that the Projection Property is equivalent to stable essentiality of the projection
map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence. Then in x4 metastability is also
characterized in terms of the stable essentiality of the local projection map. Also in x4, the
relationships of metastability to the stronger reﬁnement of Mertens’ stability and the weaker
reﬁnement of Hillas et al.’s BR-stability are established. Then in x5 we verify that metasta-
bility satisﬁes the decision-theoretic axioms listed by Mertens [13]. x6 provides concluding
remarks.
Appendix A provides mathematical background regarding homotopic essentiality and de-
ﬁnes stable essentiality of a map. Appendix B is a brief summary of the properties of
multisimplicial and polyhedral complexes invoked in the proofs in x3.6 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
2. Formulation and Definitions of Refinements
2.1. Preliminaries. Throughout, by a map we mean a continuous function. By a cor-
respondence we mean an upper-semicontinuous correspondence whose domain is compact,
whose range is a compact convex subset of a Euclidean space, and whose values are nonempty
compact convex sets. For any two correspondences ';'0 : X ! Y their distance is d(';'0) =
supx2X dH('(x);'0(x)) where dH is the Hausdorﬀ distance between compact sets. A corre-
spondence '0 is a ±-perturbation of another ' if d(';'0) 6 ±.
We consider a ﬁxed ﬁnite game G in strategic form. The player set is N = f1;:::;N g.




n Σn. Player n’s payoﬀ function is given by a multilinear function Gn : Σ ! R. We
use R : Σ ! Σ to denote the best-reply correspondence of the game G.
For each ± 2 [0;1] let Σ± be the set of ¾ 2 Σ such that
P
sn2Σ±
nnRn(¾) ¾n;sn 6 ± for each
player n, i.e. the total probability of player n’s strategies that are suboptimal against ¾ is
at most ±. Observe that all ﬁxed points of a ±-perturbation of R are contained in Σ±. Say
that a closed subset V of Σ± is admissible if V n@Σ is connected and dense in V .
For each nonnegative integer k, let Λk be the k-dimensional unit simplex in Rk+1. (Λ0 is a
single point.) Let Rk : Σ £ Λk ! Σ be the trivial extension of R, namely, Rk(¾;¸) = R(¾).
Suppose 'k £¼k : Σ£Λk ! Σ£Λk is a correspondence where 'k is a ±-perturbation of Rk.
Observe that if (¾;¸) is a ﬁxed point of 'k £ ¼k then ¾ 2 Σ±.
2.2. Deﬁnition of Metastability. We interpret Rk as the best-reply correspondence for
the players in N when G is embedded in a global game ˜ G with k additional dimensions
parameterized by ¸ 2 Λk. A perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of the global
game is then represented by a correspondence 'k £ ¼k where 'k is a ±-perturbation of Rk
and some correspondence ¼k : Σ £ Λk ! Λk describes behavior on other dimensions.
Basically, metastability requires that for each neighborhood V of a selected set S and any
k, every correspondence ¼k and suﬃciently small ±-perturbation 'k of Rk should have an
equilibrium (i.e. a ﬁxed point of 'k £¼k) whose projection is in V . The formal deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (metastability). A closed set S µ Σ is a metastable set if there exists a
sequence ±i converging to zero and a corresponding sequence of closed subsets Vi of Σ±i
converging to S such that for each i:
(1) Connexity: Vi is admissible, i.e. Vin@Σ is connected and dense in Vi.
(2) Robustness: Vi contains for every k the projection of a ﬁxed point of the product
'k£¼k of every ±i-perturbation 'k of Rk and every correspondence ¼k : Σ£Λk ! Λk.METASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 7
Among the ways one might consider modifying the Robustness condition, one seems
stronger and the other weaker. First, we could require that for each correspondence Ãk :
Σ £ Λk ! Σ £ Λk such that projΣ ± Ãk is a ±i-perturbation of Rk there exists a ﬁxed point
of Ãk in Vi £ Λk. As Theorem 3.2 shows, this is equivalent to the Robustness condition as
stated. Second, we could require that for each k there exists i(k) such that for each i > i(k)
and each correspondence 'k £ ¼k : Σ £ Λk ! Σ £ Λk, where 'k is a ±i-perturbation of Rk,
there exists a ﬁxed point in Vi£Λk. As we show at the end of x4 characterizing metastability,
this too is equivalent to the condition as stated.
From the deﬁnition one might infer that verifying whether a set of equilibria is metastable
is a formidable task. In x4 we show that a veriﬁcation is accomplished by checking that
the local projection map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence to the space
of perturbed is stably essential in the sense of homotopy. Basically, this requires that the
projection map remains essential if it is embedded in a space with extra dimensions. The
following is a version of Deﬁnition A.8 in Appendix A (cf. also Lemma A.6).
Deﬁnition 2.2 (stably essential map). Given a map p : (E;@E) ! (P;@P) where (P;@P)
is a ball pair with p(En@E) µ Pn@P, and a k-dimensional simplex Λk, let pk : (E;@E) £
(Λk;@Λk) ! (P;@P) £ (Λk;@Λk) be the trivial extension for which pk(e;¸) = (p(e);¸). The
map p is stably essential in homotopy if every trivial extension is essential in homotopy.
2.3. Related Reﬁnements. To enable later comparisons we now state the deﬁnitions of
the weaker reﬁnement proposed by Hillas et al. [8] and the stronger reﬁnement proposed by
Mertens.
The following deﬁnition is due to Hillas et al. [8].
Deﬁnition 2.3 (BR-set, BR-stable set). A closed subset S of Σ is a best-response set (BR-
set) if for every " > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that each ±-perturbation of R has a ﬁxed point
within " of S. A BR-set is BR-stable if it is a connected set of perfect equilibria.
Hillas et al. [8] show that a BR-stable set satisﬁes several of the properties listed by
Mertens [13]. BR-stability is a weaker reﬁnement in that metastability invokes the Embed-
ding Principle described in the Introduction. In eﬀect, metastability requires BR-stability
for any global game in which the given game might be embedded.
To present Mertens’ deﬁnition we need some notation. For each player n and each 0 <
± 6 1, let P± = f"¿ j 0 6 " 6 ±;¿ 2 Σg and denote its topological boundary by @P±. For
´ 2 P1, ¯ ´n ´
P
s2Σ±
n ´n;s is the minimum error probability. ¯ ´n is constant across players so
we denote this number by ¯ ´. Given any ´ 2 P1 deﬁne the perturbed game G(´) to be the8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
game where the strategy set of each player n is the same as in G, but where the payoﬀ from
a strategy proﬁle ¿ is the payoﬀ in G from the proﬁle ¾ = (1¡ ¯ ´)¿ +´. Then we say that ¾
is a perturbed equilibrium of G(´) if ¿ is an equilibrium of G(´). Let E be the graph of the
perturbed equilibrium correspondence over P1, i.e.,
E = f(´;¾) 2 P1 £ Σ j ¾ is a perturbed equilibrium of G(´)g:
For (´;¾) 2 E we use ¿(´;¾) ´ (1 ¡ ¯ ´)
¡1(¾ ¡ ´) to denote the corresponding equilibrium of
G(´). Observe that a pure strategy s of player n is in the support of ¿n(´;¾) only if it is
an optimal reply to ¾ in G. Denote by p the natural projection from E to P1. For E µ E,
let E0 = f(0;¾) 2 E g, and for 0 < ± 6 1 let (E±;@E±) = p¡1(P±;@P±) \ E. That is, as
described in the Introduction, E± is a germ.
Let ˇ H refer to ˇ Cech cohomology with integer coeﬃcients. As a mnemonic we refer to
Mertens’ deﬁnition of ¤-stability as ˇ H-stability.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (ˇ H-stable set). S µ Σ is an ˇ H-stable set if for some closed subset E of E
with E0 = f0g £ S:
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E0 in E, the set V n@E1 has a connected
component whose closure is a neighborhood of E0 in E.
(2) Cohomological Essentiality: p¤ : ˇ H¤(P±;@P±) ! ˇ H¤(E±;@E±) is nonzero for some
± > 0.
Mertens [13, 14] proposes several deﬁnitions of stability in which the essentiality require-
ment is cast in terms of singular homology with coeﬃcients in an Abelian group M. He then
shows that ˇ H-stability is the union over M of all these reﬁnement concepts and thus is the
most inclusive solution concept.
Instead of working with the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence we could
equivalently work with the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e. the set of (´;¿) 2
P1 £ Σ such that ¿ is an equilibrium of G(´) and thus ¾ = (1 ¡ ¯ ´)¿ + ´¿ is a perturbed
equilibrium of G(´). There is an obvious homeomorphism between the two spaces that
commutes with the projections to P1. Hence we obtain the same ˇ H-stable sets if we use the
graph of equilibria. This observation is true for all ‘stability’ deﬁnitions involving subsets of
E.
Mertens [14] does not explicitly deﬁne stability using essentiality in homotopy but the
following deﬁnition is implicit.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (homotopy-stable set). S µ Σ is a homotopy-stable (h-stable) set if for some
closed subset E of E with E0 = f0g £ S:METASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 9
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E0 in E, the set V n@E1 has a connected
component whose closure is a neighborhood of E0 in E.
(2) Homotopic Essentiality: p : (E±;@E±) ! (P±;@P±) is essential in homotopy for some
± > 0.
In Deﬁnitions 2.4 and 2.5, if p is essential for some ± then it is essential for all smaller ±0 < ±.
Mertens [14, Section 5] proves this for the case of ˇ H-stability. Here we show that it is true for
homotopy stability. Suppose the projection is inessential in homotopy for some 0 < ±0 < ±.
We prove that the projection is then inessential in homotopy for ±. Let q : E±0 ! @P±0 be a
map that is homotopic to p : E±0 ! P±0 relative to @E±0. The map q extends to a map over
E± when we let it coincide with p over E±nE±0. Moreover p and q are now homotopic as maps
from E± relative to @E±. Now deﬁne r : E± ! @P± as follows: pick a point ´0 2 P±0n@P±0;
then r(´;¾) is the unique point in @P± that is nearer to q(´;¾) than ´0 on the line segment
through ´ and ´0. r agrees with q over @E±, and there is a linear homotopy between q and
r. Therefore, the projection from E± is inessential.
Since essentiality in cohomology implies essentiality in homotopy, ˇ H-stable sets are also
h-stable. If E± is semialgebraic and has the same dimension as P± then the converse is true.
(In [5] we show that this is precisely the case for generic extensive-form games.) However, the
converse is not true in general since for pathological games E± can have greater dimensional
than P±—see [14, Section 4] for details.
As mentioned, Appendix A, Deﬁnition A.8, deﬁnes the stronger property of stably es-
sential in homotopy. A map is stably essential if it remains essential when its domain and
range are extended trivially to higher dimensional spaces. Using this property, the following
strengthens the deﬁnition of an h-stable set in Deﬁnition 2.5.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (stably essential set). S µ Σ is a stably essential set if for some closed subset
E of E with E0 = f0g £ S:
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E0 in E, the set V n@E1 has a connected
component whose closure is a neighborhood of E0 in E.
(2) Stable Essentiality: the projection map p : (E±;@E±) ! (P±;@P±) is stably essential
in homotopy for some ± > 0.
As before, one can show that if the k-th suspension (as deﬁned in Appendix A) of the
projection from (E±;@E±) is essential then so is that from (E±0;@E±0) for any smaller ±0.
In x4 we prove that metastable sets are the limits of stably essential sets.10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
3. Suspensions of the Best-Reply Correspondence
The purpose of this Section is to obtain results about the Robustness condition in the
deﬁnition of metastability. In x3.4 these are applied to obtain a characterization of the
Small Worlds axiom in terms of a stably essential projection from the equilibrium graph.
This section is mostly technical and so might be skipped on ﬁrst reading.
Throughout this section, V is a closed subset of Σ. Consider the following two properties.
(1k) There exists 0 < ±k 6 1 such that for each ±k-perturbation 'k of Rk and each
correspondence ¼k : Σ £ Λk ! Λk, 'k £ ¼k has a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk.
(2) There exists 0 < ± 6 1 such that for each k, each ±-perturbation 'k of Rk, and each
correspondence ¼k : Σ £ Λk ! Λk, 'k £ ¼k has a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk.
Asking for Property (2) to hold is obviously stronger than requiring Property (1k) to hold
for each k, since it is uniform in k.
Remark 3.1. Suppose that property (1k) does not hold. Then for l > k, property (1l) does
not hold. Indeed, ﬁx ± > 0 and let suppose 'k is a ±-perturbation of Rk such that for some
¼k, 'k £¼k does not have a ﬁxed point in V £Λk. For l > k, let ½l : Λl ! Λk be a retraction
(viewing Λk as a face of Λl). Deﬁne the correspondence 'l (resp. ¼l) from Σ£Λl to Σ (resp.
Λl) by 'l(¾;¸) = 'k(¾;½l(¸)) (resp. ¼l(¾;¸) = ¼k(¾;½l(¸)). Then 'l is a ±-perturbation of
Rl and 'l £ ¼l does not have a ﬁxed point in V £ Λl.
We begin with some preliminary results about Property (1k). The analogous results for
Property (2) should be obvious and we omit them.
Theorem 3.2. Property (1k) holds iﬀ there exists ±k > 0 such that every correspondence
Ãk : Σ£Λk ! Σ£Λk where 'k ´ projΣ ±Ãk is a ±k-perturbation of Rk has a ﬁxed point in
V £ Λk.
Proof. The suﬃciency part is obvious. As for necessity, given such a correspondence Ãk, let
W be the set of (¾;¸) 2 V £ Λk such that ¾ 2 'k(¾;¸). W is a closed subset of V £ Λk.
For (¾;¸) 2 W, let ¼k(¾;¸) be the set of ¸0 2 Λk such that (¾;¸0) 2 Ãk(¾;¸). ¼k : W ! Λk
is a well-behaved correspondence when W is nonempty. Extend it to a correspondence over
Σ £ Λk, denoted still by ¼k. By assumption 'k £ ¼k has a ﬁxed point (¾;¸) 2 V £ Λk. The
fact that ¾ 2 'k(¾;¸) means that (¾;¸) 2 W. Since ¸ 2 ¼k(¾;¸), we therefore have that
(¾;¸) 2 Ãk(¾;¸) and thus (¾;¸) is a ﬁxed point of Ãk in V £ Λk. ¤
Theorem 3.3. Property (1k) holds iﬀ there exists ±k > 0 such that for every ±k-perturbation
'k of Rk and every function f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk, V £ Λk contains a ﬁxed point of ' £ f.METASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 11
Proof. The necessity of the condition is obvious. As for suﬃciency, consider a correspondence
¼k : Σ £ Λk ! Λk and a ±k-perturbation 'k of R. By McLennan [12, Proposition 2.25], for
each positive integer m there exists a function fm : Σ £ Λk ! Λk whose graph is contained
in the m¡1-neighborhood of the graph of ¼k. By assumption, there exists a ﬁxed point
(¾m;¸m) 2 V £ Λk of 'k £ fm. If necessary by passing to a subsequence, the limit of the
sequence (¾m;¸m) is a ﬁxed point of 'k £ ¼ that belongs to V £ Λk. Hence, Property (1k)
holds. ¤
Remark 3.4. In view of the above Theorem, we could, in studying Properties (1k) and
(2), replace Λk with some ˜ Λk that is homeomorphic to Λk as long as we require ¼k to be a
function. (If we allow ¼k to be a correspondence then ˜ Λk must be convex too.) By a slight
abuse of notation, given such a set ˜ Λk, we still use Rk to denote the correspondence from
Σ £ ˜ Λk ! Σ that ignores the coordinates in ˜ Λk. (The exact domain of Rk should be clear
from the context.)
Though we do not use the result, the following Theorem shows that the properties we are
studying are related to suspensions of R.
Theorem 3.5. Let Id : Λk£Λk be the identity function. Property (1k) holds iﬀ there exists
±k > 0 such that each ±k-perturbation of Rk £ Id has a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk.
Proof. The necessity follows from Theorem 3.2. As for suﬃciency, suppose Property (1k)
does not hold. Then, by Theorem 3.3, for each ±k > 0, there exists a ±k-perturbation 'k of
Rk and a function f : Σ £ Λk ! Σ £ Λk such that 'k £ f does not have a ﬁxed point in
V £ Λk. Let g : Σ £ Λk ! Λk be the function g(¾;¸) = (1 ¡ ±k)¸ + ±kf(¾;¸). Then, 'k £ g
is a perturbation of Rk £ Id that does not have a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk. ¤
3.1. Essentiality of Projections. In this subsection, we show the connection among Prop-
erties (1k) and (2) and the essentiality of suspensions of the projection map from E, the graph
of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence. Throughout this section, let E = f´;¾) 2 E j
¾ 2 V g. p denotes the natural projection from E. In order to make the domain clear, we
sometimes write p± to denote the projection from (E±;@E±) to (P±;@P±). Skp± refers to the
k-th suspension of p± and pk
± : (E±;@E±) £ (Λk;@Λk) ! (P±;@P±) £ (Λk;@Λk) is the map
p±((´;¾);¸) = (´;¸). By Lemma A.6, Skp± is essential in homotopy iﬀ pk
± is.
For each 0 < ± 6 1, let Q± = f´ 2 P j ¯ ´ = ± g and denote its boundary by @Q±. Q± is
homeomorphic to the strategy space Σ. Let (F±;@F±) = p¡1(Q±;@Q±)\E±. q± : (F±;@F±) !
(Q±;@Q±) denotes the natural projection. We deﬁne Skq± and qk
± like their counterparts
above. As before, Skq± is essential in homotopy iﬀ qk
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Observe that if (´;¾) 2 E± then (´0;¾) 2 F±, where ´0 = (1 ¡ ¯ ´)
¡1((± ¡ ¯ ´)¾ + (1 ¡ ±)´).
Indeed, if a pure strategy s is not a best reply for player n against ¾ then ´n;s = ¾n;s = ´0
n;s.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose pk
± is essential for some k and ± > 0. Then qk
±0 is essential for each
0 < ±0 6 ±.
Proof. As in the remarks following Deﬁnition 2.5, one veriﬁes straightforwardly that pk
±0 is




± is inessential. Then, by Lemma A.3 there exists a correspondence
Ã : F± £ Λk ! Q± £ Λk such that Ã has no point of coincidence with qk
±. Construct now a
correspondence ˜ Ã : E± £ Λk ! P± £ Λk as follows: for each ˜ Ã((´;¾);¸) = Ã((1 ¡ ¯ ´)
¡1((± ¡
¯ ´)¾+(1¡±)´);¾;¸). By our previous observation, ˜ Ã is a well-deﬁned correspondence whose
image is contained Q± £ Λk. Obviously, it too does not have a point of coincidence with pk
±
and therefore pk
± is inessential. ¤
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that pk
±k or qk
±k is essential in homotopy for some ±k > 0. Then
Property (1k) holds. In particular, Property (2) holds if either p± or q± is stably essential for
some ± > 0.
Proof. The second statement follows trivially from the ﬁrst. We prove the ﬁrst state-
ment. Our assumption along with Lemma 3.6 implies that qk
±k is essential. Let 'k be a
±k-perturbation of Rk : Σ £ Λk ! Σ and let f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk be a function. Deﬁne
Ã : F±k £ Λk ! Q±k £ Λk as follows: Ã((´;¾);¸) is the set of all (´0;f(¾;¸)) 2 Q±k £ Λk
such that there exists ¾0 2 Σ such that ¾0 2 'k(¾;¸) and ´0 = ¾0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)¿(´;¾). (Recall
that ¿(´;¾) is the equilibrium of G(´) that corresponds to the perturbed equilibrium ¾, i.e.
¾ = (1¡¯ ´)¿(´;¾)+´.) It follows from its deﬁnition that Ã is compact and convex valued and
upper-semi-continuous. Thus, to show that Ã is a correspondence, there remains to check
that Ã is nonempty valued. Fix ((´;¾);¸). Let s1;:::;sk1 the set of all pure strategy proﬁles
that are best replies against ¾. Since 'k is a ±k-perturbation of Rk, there exists for each
1 6 i 6 k1 a mixed strategy proﬁle ¾i 2 'k(¾;¸) that is within ±k of si (when viewing si as a
point in Σ). Therefore, ´i ´ ¾i¡(1¡±k)si belongs to Q±k for all i. Let ¿(si) be the probabil-
ity of si in ¿(´;¾). Obviously
P
i ¿(si) = 1, because ¿(´;¾) is the equilibrium of G(´) that
corresponds to the perturbed equilibrium ¾. Since 'k is convex valued, we now have that
P
i ¿(si)¾i belongs to 'k(¾;¸). Moreover,
P
i ¿(si)¾i ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)¿(´;¾) =
P
i ¿(si)´i 2 Q±k.
Hence (
P
i ¿(si)´i;f(¾;¸)) belongs to Ã((´;¾);¸) and Ã is nonempty valued. Our assump-
tion and Lemma A.2 imply that Ã has a point of coincidence with qk
±k: there exists (´;¾;¸)
such that (´;¸) 2 Ã((´;¾;¸)) and ¯ ´ = ±k. By the deﬁnition of Ã, there exists ¾0 2 Σ suchMETASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 13
that: (a) ¾0 2 'k(¾;¸); and (b) ´ = ¾0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¿(´;¾). Therefore, using the deﬁnition of
¿(´;¾) we have ´ = ¾0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)(1 ¡ ¯ ´)
¡1(¾ ¡ ´) = ¾0 ¡ ¾ + ´. Thus, ¾0 = ¾ 2 'k(¾;¸).
Also, since (¾;´;¸) is a point of coincidence between Ã and qk
±k, we have that ¸ = f(¾;¸).
(¾;¸) is then a ﬁxed point of 'k £f. Since (´;¾) 2 E, ¾ 2 V by deﬁnition, and the proof is
complete. ¤
The following theorem gives a partial converse to the previous theorem.
Theorem 3.8. Let d be the dimension of P1.
(1) If Property (1k) holds for some k > d, then p
k¡d
± is essential in homotopy for all
0 < ± 6 ±k.
(2) If Property (1k) holds for some k > d ¡ 1, then q
k¡d¡1
± is essential in homotopy for
all 0 < ± 6 ±k.
(3) If Property (2) holds, then p±0 and q±0 are stably essential for all 0 < ±0 6 ±. Moreover,
if V is semialgebraic then it contains a stably essential set.
Proof. As before, the ﬁrst statement in 3 follows from statements 1 and 2. We prove state-
ment 1. (The proof for statement 2 is analogous.) By Lemma A.3 it is suﬃcient to show that
every function f : E± £ Λk¡d ! P± £ Λk¡d has a point of coincidence with the function pk
±.
Accordingly, ﬁx such a function f. Extend f to a function from P± £Σ£Λk¡d ! P± £Λk¡d,
denoting it still by f.
Let 'k : Σ £ P± £ Λk¡d ! Σ be deﬁned as follows. For each (¾;´;¸), letting ´0 be
the projection of f(´;¾;¸) to P±, 'k(¾;´;¸) is the set of ¿ > ´0
n;s such that ¿n;s = ´0
n;s
if strategy s is not a best reply for player n against ¾. Then 'k is a ±-perturbation of
Rk : Σ £ P± £ Λk¡d ! Σ. Using Remark 3.4, our assumption implies the existence of a
ﬁxed point (¾;´;¸) of the correspondence 'k £ f where ¾ 2 V . Since f(¾;´;¸) = (´;¸), we
have by the construction of 'k that (´;¾) belongs to E± and hence that (¾;´;¸) is a point
of coincidence between p
k¡d
± and f, which proves that p
k¡d
± is essential in homotopy.
We now prove the second part of statement 3. Suppose now that V is semialgebraic. Then
E is semialgebraic. Let S = f¾ j (0;¾) 2 E g. Obviously S µ V . We now show that S
contains a stably essential set. Since Property (2) holds, p± is stably essential, as we have
just seen. Let X be the closure of En@E1. Clearly, X is a compact semialgebraic set and
f¾ j (0;¾) 2 X g µ S. Moreover, by Remark A.7 the projection from X is also stably
essential.
Let f : X ! R be the function f(´;¾) = ¯ ´. By deﬁnition, we have that for each ± > 0,
f¡1([0;±]) = X±. By [15, Lemma 2] there exist a positive integer l, a real number ±1 > 0,
and semialgebraic sets X1;:::Xl, such that for each 0 < ± 6 ±1: (i) for each i, Xi
±n@Xi
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connected and dense in Xi
±, where @Xi
± = @X±\Xi
±; (ii) i 6= j implies Xi
±\X
j
± µ @X1; and (iii)
[iXi
± = X±. By property (i), each of the Xi’s satisﬁes the connexity requirement of Deﬁnition
2.6. Since X satisﬁes the essentiality property of Deﬁnition 2.6, by Properties (ii) and (iii),
there exists i such that Xi satisﬁes the stable essentiality property and f¾ j (0;¾) 2 Xi g is
a stably essential set. ¤
Remark 3.9. There is a certain asymmetry in the preceding two theorems. While the
essentiality of Skp or Skq implies the Robustness property for Rk, our proof of Lemma 3.8
requires the Robustness property for Rk+d—not just that of Rk—to obtain the essentiality
of Skp. It is not clear to us if Robustness of Rk suﬃces.
If Property (1k) holds for each k then, by the previous theorem, pk
±k is essential for each k.
As k grows large, if ±k goes to zero, then p± is not stably essential. In other words Property
(2) fails to obtain. We do not have an example exhibiting this phenomenon. Our next
theorem gives suﬃcient conditions when this does not happen.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose V is a semialgebraic set. And suppose Property (1k) holds for
each k. Then Property (2) holds.
The proof of this theorem uses the following lemma, which is stated in a slightly more
general form here because it is used in the next section. Let X be a closed semialgebraic
subset of E. For each 0 < ± 6 1, let (Y±;@Y±) be the inverse image of (Q±;@Q±) under the
projection map from X to P1, and let q± : (Y±;@Y±) ! (Q±;@Q±) be the natural projection.
For each k, qk
± and pk
± are deﬁned exactly as we deﬁned them for the sets F and E respectively.
Lemma 3.11. There exists ±0 > 0 such that for each k and 0 < ± 6 ±0, qk
± is essential iﬀ qk
±0
is. Moreover, pk
±0 is essential iﬀ q
k+1
±0 is.
Proof of the Lemma. Since X is semialgebraic, for each maximal proper face F® of P1 other
than Q1, X® ´ X \ p¡1(F ®) is semialgebraic as well. Let " : X ! [0;1] be the function
"(´;¾) = ¯ ´. By the Generic Local Triviality Theorem [1, Proposition 9.3.2] there exists
±0 > 0, a semialgebraic ﬁber C, with for each maximal proper face F ® 6= Q1 a closed
semialgebraic subset C® of C, and a homeomorphism h : (0;±0] £ C ! "¡1(0;±0], such that:
(i) for each ®, h maps (0;±0] £ C® into X®; (ii) h maps f± g £ C onto Y± for 0 < ± 6 ±0.
Let @C = [®C®. For each 0 < ± 6 ±0, deﬁne h± : (C;@C) ! (Y±;@Y±) be the map the
h±(c) = h(±;c). h± is then a homeomorphism. And q± is essential iﬀ q± ±h± is. For each k, we
now have a homeomorphism hk
± : (C;@C)£(Λk;@Λk) ! (Y±;@Y±)£(Λk;@Λk) with the identity
function on the factor Λk. And qk
± is essential iﬀ qk
± ± hk
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by f± = r± ± q±0 ± h±0, where r± : (Q±0;@Q±0) ! (Q±;@Q±) is the function r±(´) = ±´=±0. We
claim that f± is linearly homotopic to q± ±h±. Indeed, this claim follows from the fact that if
c 2 C® for some ®, then its images under q± ± h± and q±0 ± h±0 (and hence also f±) belong to
F ®. Deﬁne fk
± in the obvious way and we have that qk
± is essential iﬀ fk
± is essential. Observe
that r± is a homeomorphism. Therefore, f± is essential iﬀ qk
±0 ± hk
±0 is essential, i.e. iﬀ qk
±0 is.
We now turn to the second statement. As we saw above, q
k+1





is. Let (Z;@Z) = ([0;±0];f0;±0 g) £ (C;@C). For each k, let fk : (Z;@Z) £ (Λk;@Λk) !
([0;±0];f0;±0 g) £ (Q±0;@Q±0) £ (Λk;@Λk) be the map given by fk(±;c;¸) = (±;h(±0;c);¸).
Using Lemma A.6, therefore, q
k+1
±0 is essential iﬀ fk is essential. Deﬁne ¯ Z be the quotient
space of Z ´ [0;±0] £ C obtained by collapsing f0g £ C to a point, call it c0. And let @ ¯ Z
be the image of (([0;±0]) £ @C)) [ (f0;±0 g £ C) under the quotient map. Likewise there
is a quotient map from ([0;±0];f0;±0 g) £ (Q±0;@Q±0) to (P±0;@P±0) that sends (±;´) to ±´.
Deﬁne ¯ fk : ( ¯ Z;@ ¯ Z) £ (Λk;@Λk) ! (P±0;@P±0) £ (Λk;@Λk) as follows: ¯ fk(c0;¸) = (0;¸); for
0 < ± 6 ±0, c 2 C, ¸ 2 Λk, ¯ fk(±;c;¸) = fk(±;c;¸). By Lemma A.5, fk is essential iﬀ ¯ fk is.
Let ¯ X be the quotient space of X±0 obtained by collapsing p
¡1
±0 (0) to a point, x0, and let
@ ¯ X be the image of @X±0 under the quotient map. Let ¯ p±0 be corresponding projection map
to P±0: it maps x0 to 0 and each other point (´;¾) to ´. For each k, ¯ pk
±0 is also deﬁned in an
analogous way. By Lemma A.5, for each k, pk
±0 is essential iﬀ ¯ pk
±0 is essential.
The map h extends to a homeomorphism ¯ h between ( ¯ Z;@ ¯ Z) and ( ¯ X;@ ¯ X) by letting
¯ h(c0) = x0. For each k, ¯ hk is deﬁned in the obvious way. We now have that ¯ pk
±0 is essential
iﬀ ¯ pk
±0 ± ¯ hk is essential. The latter map is linearly homotopic to ¯ fk for the same reason that
f± was linearly homotopic to q± ± h±. Hence pk
±0 is essential iﬀ q
k+1
±0 is. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.10. Since V is semialgebraic, E is semialgebraic and the above lemma
applies. In particular, there exists ±0 > 0 satisfying the conditions given there. By assump-
tion, for each k, there exists ±k such that Property (1k) holds. Without loss of generality we
can assume that ±k 6 ±0. Using Theorem 3.8 and the above lemma, qk
±0 is essential for each
k. By Theorem 3.7, Property (2) holds. ¤
3.2. Suﬃciency of Essential Projections. By the results of the previous subsection,
checking whether Property (2) holds is equivalent to checking whether pk
± or qk
± is stably
essential, which involves checking the essentiality of an inﬁnity of maps. There is hence the
question of whether there exists a k such that the essentiality of the k-th suspension of p±
implies that p± is stably essential. We do not know the answer to this question in general.
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implies its stable essentiality. This result, therefore, yields the following theorem, the proof
of which is obvious.
Theorem 3.12. Suppose V is semialgebraic. Let d be the dimension of P1. If the dimension
of E is less than d, then Property (2) fails to hold. If the dimension of E is d, then Property
(2) holds iﬀ p± is essential.
3.3. CKM Perturbations. Hillas et al. [8] introduce the notion of continuous Kohlberg-
Mertens perturbations (CKM perturbations). A CKM perturbation is a function g : Σ ! P1.
Such a function g produces a perturbation 'g of R deﬁned as follows: 'g(¾) is the set of
(1 ¡ ¯ g(¾))¿ + g(¾) such that ¿ 2 R(¾). Analogous to BR-sets, S is a CKM set if for every
" > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that for each g : Σ ! P±, 'g has a ﬁxed point within " of S.
Hillas et al. [8] show that the CKM sets are exactly the BR-sets.
The results of the preceding subsection show that one obtains such an equivalence between
the two notions. Observe that in the proof of Theorem 3.8, we need only a speciﬁc type
of perturbation of Rk, which are “suspensions” of CKM perturbations. Speciﬁcally, given a
function g from Σ£Λk to P± (resp. Q±), we can generate a perturbation 'k
g of Rk by letting
'k
g(¾;¸) be the set of (1 ¡ ¯ g(¾;¸))¿ + g(¾;¸), where ¿ is a best reply to ¾. For p± (resp. q±)
to be stably essential, it suﬃcient that for each such g and f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk, 'k
g £ f have
a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk. In conjunction with Theorem 3.7, we therefore have the following
Theorem.
Theorem 3.13. Property (2) holds iﬀ for each k, and each function f£g : Σ£Λk ! Λk£P±,
'k
g £ f has a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk.
3.4. The Small-Worlds Projection Property. We show here that Property (2) is equiv-
alent to a projection property as in the Small Worlds axiom. We begin with a deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.14 (N-equivalent game). A ﬁnite game ˜ G in strategic form is N-equivalent
to G if: (i) the player set of ˜ G includes N; (ii) for each n 2 N, his set of pure strategies is
Σ±
n; and (iii) the payoﬀs of each n 2 N depend only on the strategy choices of the players in
N and coincide with his payoﬀs in G.
We refer to those players in ˜ G who do not belong to N as the ‘outsiders.’
Theorem 3.15. Property (2) iﬀ there exists ± > 0 such that for each game ˜ G that is N-
equivalent to G, every ±-perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of ˜ G that leaves the
best-reply correspondence of the outsiders unchanged has a ﬁxed point whose projection to
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Proof. For an N-equivalent game ˜ G the strategy set of the outsiders is a convex polytope, call
it ˜ Λ. Letting k be the dimension of ˜ Λ, any ±-perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of
˜ G (even those that perturb the coordinates of the outsiders) is of the form Rk £¼ : Σ£ ˜ Λ !
Σ £ ˜ Λ. Therefore, the necessity of the condition follows from Remark 3.4.
We now prove the suﬃciency part. Fix k and let ' be a ±-perturbation of Rk and let
f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk be a function. Suppose ' £ f does not have a ﬁxed point in V £ Λk.
We now construct an equivalent game and a ±-perturbation of its best-reply correspondence
that leaves the best-reply correspondence of the outsiders unchanged and that does not have
a ﬁxed point projecting to a point in V . The proof of this last fact is quite involved and
is therefore broken into three steps. It uses deﬁnitions and results in Appendix B about
multisimplices (i.e., products of simplices) and polyhedral complexes.
Step 1—simplicial preliminaries. Let C be the closed set consisting of those points
(¾;¸) 2 V £ Λk such that ¾ 2 '(¾;¸). For each (¾;¸) 2 C, ¸ 6= f(¸). Therefore, we
can choose a number ® > 0 that is strictly smaller than kf(¾;¸) ¡ ¸k for all (¾;¸) 2 C.
Let K be the simplicial complex obtained by taking a suﬃciently ﬁne simplicial subdivision
of Λk so that each simplex of K is a convex polyhedron and has diameter at most ®=2.
By the multisimplicial approximation theorem (see Theorem B.3) there exists a barycentric
subdivision L of K and, for each n, a barycentric subdivision Tn of Σn such that the map
f : Σ£Λk ! Λk has a multisimplicial approximation g from the complex T £L to K, where
T ´
Q
n Tn. If (¾;¸) 2 C, then kf(¾;¸) ¡ ¸k > ®, while kf(¾;¸) ¡ g(¾;¸)k 6 ®=2 since
the diameter of each simplex of K is at most ®=2; therefore kg(¾;¸) ¡ ¸k > ®=2; i.e., ¸ and
g¤(¾;¸) belong to diﬀerent simplices of K. Finally let Q be a polyhedral complex that is
a reﬁnement of T £ L (viewed as a polyhedral complex) such that there exists a convex,
piecewise-aﬃne function ° : Σ£Λk ! R with the property that the maximal convex domains
on which ° is aﬃne are the full-dimensional polyhedra of Q—see Theorem B.4.
Step 2—constructing an equivalent game ˜ G. We are now ready to deﬁne a game ˜ G
that is N-equivalent to G. The set ˜ N of players in ˜ G is N [O, where the set O of outsiders
comprises three players, denoted o1;o2;o3.
Step 2A—the strategy sets. The strategy sets of players in N are as before. The
mixed strategy sets Σo1 and Σo2 of players o1 and o2 have as their vertices (these players’
pure strategies) the sets of vertices of L and K, respectively. The mixed strategy set Σo3
of player o3 has as its vertices the class of full-dimensional polyhedra of Q. Observe that
each pure strategy s 2 Σ±
o1 corresponds to a unique point ¸(s) in Λk; since Λk is a convex18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
set, there is now an aﬃne function h from the set Σo1 of his mixed strategies to the set Λk
that sends each mixed strategy to the corresponding average of the vertices, i.e., for each
¾o1 2 Σo1, h(¾o1) =
P
s2So1 ¾o1;s¸(s) 2 Λk, where ¾o1;s is the probability of pure strategy s
in ¾o1.
Step 2B—the payoﬀ functions. To complete the description of the game we describe
the payoﬀ functions. For players in N their payoﬀs depend only on the strategy choices of
the players in N and coincide with their payoﬀs in G.
Player o1’s payoﬀs depend only on his choice and that of player o2, and they are deﬁned as
follows. For pure strategies s 2 Σ±
o1 and t 2 Σ±
o2, o1’s payoﬀ G¤
o1(s;t) is the t-th barycentric
coordinate of s in the complex K. (Thus player o1 tries to mimic o2’s strategy.)
Player o2’s payoﬀs depend on the strategy choices of all players. They are deﬁned as
follows. Suppose player o3 picks a pure strategy so3. Let T £ L be the unique multisimplex
of T £ L that contains the full-dimensional polyhedron corresponding to so3. For each pure
strategy s 2 Σ±
o2, deﬁne a multilinear function G¤
o2;s;so3 : T £ L ! R as follows: for each
vertex v of T £ L, G¤
o2;s;so3(v) = 1 if g(v) = s and zero otherwise. Since T £ L is a full-
dimensional multisimplex of Σ£Λk, this function extends uniquely to a multilinear function
over the whole of Σ£Λk, denoted still as G¤
o2;s;so3. Given now a mixed strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ
for players in N, a mixed strategy ¿o1 for player o1, and the pure strategy so3 for player o3,
player o2’s payoﬀ if he plays a pure strategy s is G¤
o2;s;so3(¾;h(¿o1)). Obviously, player o2’s
payoﬀ function is multilinear in the strategies of his opponents.
Player o3’s payoﬀs are a linear function of the strategies of players in ˜ Nnfo2 g and are
deﬁned as follows. Let s be a pure strategy of player o3. Let Q ½ Σ £ Λk be the full-
dimensional polyhedron corresponding to s. The restriction of ° to Q is aﬃne and, since Q
is full-dimensional, admits a unique aﬃne extension, call it G¤
o3;s, to the whole of Σ £ Λk.
Player o3’s payoﬀ function is given by G¤
o3(so3;¾¤
¡o3) = G¤
o3;so3(¾;¸), where ¸ = h(¾¤
o1) and ¾
is the projection of ¾¤ to Σ.
The description of ˜ G is now complete. By construction ˜ G is N-equivalent to G. Let ˜ R be
the best-reply correspondence of the game ˜ G.
Step 3—analyzing ˜ R. The perturbation of ˜ R we construct below leaves the coordinates
of players not in N the same as in ˜ R. Therefore, we ﬁrst analyze the structure of ˜ R. Let
¾¤ be a mixed strategy proﬁle and let ¾ be the projection of ¾¤ to Σ. Let ¸ = h(¾¤
o1). The
following Lemma summarizes the relevant aspects of ˜ R.
Lemma 3.16. For each player m 2 ˜ N, let Σ¤
m ½ Σ±
m be the support of ¾¤
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(1) Suppose that the vertices in Σ¤
o2 span a simplex K¤ in K. Then each pure optimal
reply of player o1 belongs to K¤.
(2) Suppose that each s 2 Σ¤
o3 contains (¾;¸). Each pure optimal reply for o2 against ¾¤
is a vertex of the unique simplex of K that contains g(¾;¸) in its interior.
(3) Player o3’s set of pure optimal replies to ¾¤ is the class of all polyhedra that contain
(¾;¸).
Proof of Lemma. 1. Player o1’s payoﬀ if he plays so1 2 Σ±






where ¾o2;s is the probability of s in ¾¤
o2 and so1(s) is the s-th barycentric coordinate of so1
in the complex K. By assumption the support of ¾o2 spans a simplex in K, so it follows




o2 is the subset of pure strategies of o2 that are assigned the highest probability
under ¾o2. Since the vertices in Σ¤¤
o2 span a simplex that is a face of K¤, each pure optimal
reply for o1 belongs to K¤.
2. Let T ¤ £ L¤ be the unique multisimplex of T £ L that contains (¾;¸) in its interior. Let
K0 be the unique simplex of K that contains g(¾;¸) in its interior. By the construction of
player o2’s payoﬀ function, for each polyhedron so3 2 Σ±
o3 that contains (¾;¸) the payoﬀ to
player o2 from playing so2 2 Σ±
o2, if player o3 plays so3 and all others play according to ¾¤, is
positive iﬀ so2 is a vertex of K0. Since, by assumption, each so3 2 Σ¤
o3 contains (¾;¸), each
optimal reply for o2 is a vertex of K0.
3. By construction, for each pure strategy s of player o3, G¤
o3(s;¾¤
¡o3) 6 °(¾;¸) where the
inequality is strict unless the polyhedron s contains (¾;¸). Thus, player o3’s set of pure
optimal replies is the class of polyhedra that contain (¾;¸). ¤
Step 4—perturbing ˜ R. We now construct a ±-perturbation ˜ ' of ˜ R that perturbs only
the components of ˜ R that pertain to the players in N, as follows. For each mixed strategy
proﬁle ¾¤ in the game ˜ G, the coordinates of the original players in N under ˜ ' are given
by ˜ 'N(¾¤) = '(¾;¸), where ¾ is the projection of ¾¤ to Σ and ¸ = h(¾¤
o1). Since ' is a
±-perturbation of Rk, ˜ ' is a ±-perturbation of ˜ R.
Step 5—ﬁxed points of ˜ '. To ﬁnish the proof we show that ˜ ' has no ﬁxed point whose
projection is contained in V . Let ˜ ¾ be a ﬁxed point of ˜ ' and let ¾ be the projection of ˜ ¾ into
Σ. Also, let ¸ = h(˜ ¾o1). Since ˜ ¾ is a ﬁxed point of ˜ ', ¾ 2 '(¾;¸). We show that if ¾ 2 V
then (¾;¸) = 2 C, which completes the proof. For each m 2 ˜ N let S¤
m be the support of ¾¤
m.
Also, let K be the unique simplex of K that contains g(¾;¸) in its interior. By Property 3 of
Lemma 3.16, (¾;¸) belongs to each s 2 Σ¤
o3. Hence, by Property 2, the vertices in Σ¤
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a simplex K¤ that is a face of K. By Property 1 now, each s 2 Σ¤
o1 belongs to K¤. Hence,
¸ 2 K¤ µ K. By deﬁnition, g(¾;¸) 2 K. Therefore, (¾;¸) = 2 C. (Recall from step 1 that for
a point (¾;¸) 2 C, ¸ and g(¾;¸) belong to diﬀerent simplices.) Thus, ˜ ' has no ﬁxed point
projecting to a point in V . ¤
4. Characterization of Metastability
We now obtain topological characterizations of metastable sets, and establish the relation
of metastable sets to stably essential and ˇ H-stable sets.
Lemma 4.1. S is metastable iﬀ there exists ±0 > 0 and for each 0 < ± 6 ±0 there exists a
closed semialgebraic subset W± of Σ± such that:
(1) W±n@Σ is connected and dense in W±.
(2) For each k, each ±-perturbation ' of Rk, and each function f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk,
' £ f has a ﬁxed point whose projection to Σ is contained in W±.
(3) W±0 µ W± if 0 < ±0 < ±.
(4) \±W± = S.
Proof. The suﬃciency part of the proof is obvious. We turn now to the necessity of the
conditions. Let ±i be a monotone sequence of positive numbers converging to zero and let Vi
be a corresponding sequence satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.1. Take a triangulation
of Σ. For each l, let Σl be the l-th barycentric subdivision of this triangulation. Let P l be
the simplices of Σl that intersect S. For each l let Xl be the closure of f(±;¾) 2 [0;1]£P l j
0 < ± < 1;¾ 2 Σ±n@Σg in [0;1] £ P l, and let @Xl = f(±;¾) 2 Xl j ± = 0 or ¾ 2 @Σg, and
let gl : Xl ! [0;1] be the projection to the ﬁrst coordinate. By [15, Lemma 2] there exists
0 < ¯ ±l 6 1, a ﬁnite number of closed semialgebraic subsets Xl;1;:::;Xl;jl of Xl such that for
each 0 < ± 6 ¯ ±l and each j, letting X
l;j
± = (gl)
¡1([0;±]) \ Xl;j, we have:
(a) X
l;j
± n(@Xl [ (gl)












Suppose for 0 < ±;±0 6 ¯ ±l that (±;¾) and (±0;¾) belong to Xln@Xl. Then ((¸± +(1¡¸±0);¾)
belongs to Xln@Xl for all ¸ 2 [0;1], and the above properties imply the property
(d) (±;¾) belongs to X
l;j
±k iﬀ (±0;¾) does.
Since P l is a neighborhood of S, it is a neighborhood of Vi for large i. Therefore, by the
connexity property for Vi, and also by the above properties of Xl, if i is also large enough
such that ±i 6 ¯ ±l then there exists 1 6 ji 6 jl such that f±i g £ (Vin@Σ), and hence also itsMETASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 21
closure f±i g £ Vi, is contained in X
l;ji
±i . Along a subsequence of i’s now, ji is constant, say
1. Obtain by the diagonalization process, a subsequence of i’s such that for each l and i > l,
Vi µ P l, ±i 6 ¯ ±l and f±i g £ Vi is contained in X
l;1
¯ ±l .
For each 0 < ± 6 ±1 deﬁne W± to be the projection of X
l;1
± to Σ, where l is the unique
integer such that ±l+1 < ± 6 ±l. We show that the W±’s satisfy the four enumerated conditions
of the theorem. For the ﬁrst three properties, we ﬁx ±l+1 < ± 6 ±l.
Property 1. Property (a) implies that the set of (±0;¾) 2 X
l;1
± such that ¾ = 2 @Σ is connected.
Hence W±n@Σ, which is the image of this set under the projection to Σ, is connected. Suppose
¾ 2 W±. Then there exists (±;¾) 2 X
l;1
± . By Property (a) again, there exists a sequence
(±i;¾i) in X
l;1
± n@Xl;1 converging to (±;¾). Obviously the sequence ¾i belongs to W±n@Σ and
converges to ¾. Hence W±n@Σ is dense in W±.
Property 2. Since Vl µ P l, if ¾ belongs to Vl \ (Σ±n@Σ) then (±;¾) belongs to Xl. Because
(±l;¾) 2 X
l;1
±l and 0 < ±l 6 ¯ ±l, property (d) gives us that (±;¾) belongs to X
l;1
± n@Xl. Hence
W±n@Σ contains ¾. In other words, W±n@Σ ¶ Vl \ (Σ±n@Σ).
Let Q± = f´ 2 P± j ¯ ´ = ± g and let @Q± be its relative boundary. Deﬁne F± = f(´;¾) 2
E j ¾ 2 W±; ¯ ´ = ± g. By Theorem 3.7 it is suﬃcient to show that the natural projection
q± : (F±;@F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is stably essential, where @F± = q
¡1
± (@Q±). Let ¯ F± = f(´;¾) 2
E j ¾ 2 Vl; ¯ ´ = ± g. By Theorem 3.8 the projection ¯ q± : ( ¯ F±;@ ¯ F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is stably
essential. Let ˆ F± be the closure of ¯ F±n@ ¯ F±. By Remark A.7, ˆ q± : ( ˆ F±;@ ˆ F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is
stably essential. Consider now a point (´;¾) 2 ˆ F±n@ ˆ F±. Then ¾ 2 Vl \ (Σ±n@Σ). As we saw
in the previous paragraph, ¾ then belongs to W± and thus (´;¾) belongs to F±. Since ˆ F±n@ ˆ F±
is dense in ˆ F±, we have that ( ˆ F±;@ ˆ F±) µ (F±;@F±). The stable essentiality of ˆ q± now implies
that of q±.
Property 3. It is suﬃcient to prove that if ±l+1 6 ±0 < ± then W±0 µ W±. If ±0 > ±l+1 then




± . Observe that if ±0 = ±l+1 then property (a)
for X
l+1;1
±l+1 implies that X
l+1;1
±l+1 n@Xl+1 is a connected subset of (gl)
¡1([0;±])n@Xl; moreover,
by construction, it contains f±l+1 g £ (Vl+1n@Σ). Since X
l;1
± n@Xl contains this latter set, by
properties (a) (b) and (c) above X
l+1;1
±l+1 n@Xl+1 µ X
l;1
± n@Xl. Using property (a) again, we
get that X
l+1;1
±l+1 is contained in Xl
±. Hence W±l+1 µ W±.
Property 4. By property (3) it is suﬃcient to show that \lW±l = S. For each l, since f±l g£Vl
is contained X
l;1
±l , W±l contains Vl. Since the Vl’s converge to S, \lW±l contains S. On the
other hand, for each l, W±l is contained in P l, and the P l’s form a basis of neighborhoods of
S. Hence \lW±l is contained in S and thus we obtain (4). ¤22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
We now provide a characterization of metastability in terms of subsets of the graph E of
the equilibria of perturbed games. For each 0 < ± 6 1, as in the above proof let Q± = f´ 2
P± j ¯ ´ = ± g and let @Q± be its relative boundary. Let (F±;@F±) = p¡1(Q±;@Q±). We have a
well-deﬁned correspondence Ã± : Σ± ! F± given by Ã±(¾) = f(´;¾) 2 F± g.
Theorem 4.2. S µ Σ is metastable iﬀ there exists a closed subset E of E with E0 = f0g£S
and:
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E0 in E, the set V n@E1 has a connected
component whose closure is a neighborhood of E0 in E.
(2) Stable Essentiality: There exists ±0 > 0 such for each 0 < ± 6 ±0, letting (F±;@F±) =
p¡1(Q±;@Q±)\E, the natural projection q± : (F±;@F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is stably essential
in homotopy.
Proof. Given a metastable set S there exists a collection of W±’s satisfying the conditions in
Lemma 4.1. Deﬁne E to be the closure of [0<±6±0Ã±(W±n@Σ)n@F±. E is obviously a closed
subset of E. Moreover, it is nonempty: indeed, for each 0 < ± < ±0, if ¾ 2 W±0n@Σ then
¾ 2 W±n@Σ and Ã±(¾)n@F± is nonempty. We prove that it satisﬁes the other conditions of
the theorem.
We show ﬁrst that E0 = f0g £ S. Observe that (0;¾) 2 E0 iﬀ there exists a sequence of
±i’s converging to zero, and a corresponding sequence (´i;¾i) in Ã±i(W±in@Σ) converging to
(0;¾); this last condition is equivalent to the existence of a sequence ¾i 2 W±in@Σ converging
to ¾. By Property 4 of Lemma 4.1, therefore, (0;¾) 2 E0 iﬀ ¾ 2 S.
Fix 0 < ± 6 ±0. By the robustness property for W± and Theorem 3.8, the projection
¯ q± : ( ¯ F±;@ ¯ F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is stably essential, where ¯ F± = Ã±(W±). Let ˆ F± be the closure
of ¯ F±n@ ¯ F±. Then by Remark A.7, the projection ˆ q± : ( ˆ F±;@ ˆ F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is also stably
essential. Observe that ˆ F± is contained in F±. Indeed, if (´;¾) 2 ˆ F±n@ ˆ F± then ¾ 2 W±n@Σ,
´ = 2 @Q±, and (´;¾) 2 Ã±(¾). Therefore ˆ F±n@ ˆ F±, and hence its closure ˆ F± are contained in
F±. The stable essentiality of ˆ q± now implies that of q±. Hence E satisﬁes the essentiality
condition.
Again ﬁx 0 < ± 6 ±0. Since W±n@Σ is connected and Ã± is a well-deﬁned correspondence,
Ã±0(W±0n@Σ)n@F±0 is connected for all 0 < ±0 < ±. Also, for 0 < ±0 < ±, if (´0;¾) 2
Ã±0(W±0n@Σ)n@F±0 then for all ± > ±00 > ±0, ¾ 2 W±00 by Property (3) of Lemma 4.1, and
there exists (´00;¾) 2 Ã±00(¾)n@F±00. Therefore, for each ¸ 2 [0;1], (¸´00 + (1 ¡ ¸)´0;¾) 2
Ã¸±00+(1¡¸)±0(W¸±00+(1¡¸)±0n@Σ)n@F¸±0+(1¡¸)±. Hence, [0<±0<±Ã±0(W±0n@Σ)n@F±0 is connected.
Since E is obtained by taking the closure of [0<±0<±0Ã±0(W±0n@Σ)n@F±0, we have that E±n@E±
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connexity condition now follows from the fact that the E±’s form a basis of neighborhoods of
f0g £ S in E. This completes the proof of the necessity of the conditions. The suﬃciency
part follows from Theorems 4.3 and 4.4. ¤
Theorem 4.3. Let E be a subset of E that satisﬁes the connexity and essentiality conditions
of Theorem 4.2 and let S = f¾ j (0;¾) 2 E g. Then S is the Hausdorﬀ limit of a sequence
Sl of semialgebraic stably essential sets. Moreover, the sequence can be chosen such that
for each l, Sl has a germ El that is semialgebraic and satisﬁes the following stronger version
of the connexity requirement: there exists ±l > 0 such that for each 0 < ± 6 ±l, El
±n@El
± is
connected and dense in El
±.
Proof. Triangulate E such that E0 = p¡1(0) and @E1 = p¡1(@P1) are full subcomplexes. Let ˜ E
be the union of the simplices of E that do not intersect E0. Denote by El
0 the l-th barycentric
subdivision of E0. ˜ El
0 and ˜ E uniquely determine a triangulation El for E.
By the connexity condition there exists a decreasing sequence V r of neighborhoods of S in
E such that V rn@E1 is connected and dense in V r. Let El;r be the union of the simplices of
El whose interiors intersect V rn@E1. Obviously V r is contained in El;r since V rn@E1 is dense
in V r. For each l, the El;r’s form a decreasing sequence in r. Because El is a ﬁnite complex
there exists r(l) such that for each r > r(l), El;r is constant, say El. If l0 > l then for each
r, El;r ¶ El0;r and hence El ¶ El0. For each l, El
0 contains E0, since it contains V r for large
r. Hence, letting Sl
0 = f¾ j (0;¾) 2 El g, we have S µ \lSl
0. On the other hand, letting P l
be the set of simplices of El
0 that intersect E0, we have that El
0 µ P l: indeed, each principal
simplex of El intersects V r for large r and hence intersects E0; since E1
0 is full subcomplex
of El, the intersection of such a simplex with El
0 is a face of the simplex and hence belongs
to P l; thus El
0 µ P l. The fact that the El
0 form a decreasing sequence converging to E0
therefore implies that \lEl
0 µ E0. Consequently, the Sl
0’s converge to S.
Fix l. Both El and El
0 are obviously semialgebraic. To ﬁnish the proof, we show that El
satisﬁes the stronger form of the connexity condition in the statement of the theorem and
also the essentiality condition in Deﬁnition 2.6, which then ensures that El
0 is stably essential.
To obtain the connexity condition, we use Theorem 1 of Section 2 of [14]: it is suﬃcient to
show that: (a) El is the closure of Eln@El
1; and (b) for each 0 < ® 6 1, the set W® of points
in Eln@El whose simplicial distance from El
0 is strictly smaller than ® is connected. With
regard to (a), since @El
1 is a full subcomplex, the intersection of every principal simplex of
El with @El is a face of the simplex; moreover, it cannot equal the simplex itself because the
simplex intersects V rn@E1 for all large r; hence El is the closure of Eln@El
1. Now, we turn
to (b). El
0 and @El
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W® \ El
0 and @El
1 are proper faces of of it; hence its intersection with W®n@El is connected.
But, for r large enough, the connected set V rn@E1 is contained in W® and intersects every
principal simplex of El. Therefore, W®n@El
1 is connected. Thus, we have established the
connexity condition for El.
There remains to prove the essentiality condition for El. By construction El contains E±
for all suﬃciently small ±. Therefore, by the Robustness condition for E, q± : (F l
±;@F l
±) !
(Q±;@Q±) is stably essential for all small ±, where (F l
±;@F l
±) is the inverse image of (Q±;@Q±) in
El under the natural projection. Since El is semialgebraic, by Lemma 3.11, p± : (El
±;@El
±) !
(P±;@P±) is stably essential for some small ±. Hence, El satisﬁes the essentiality condition
in Deﬁnition 2.6 as well. ¤
Theorem 4.4. The Hausdorﬀ limit of a sequence of stably essential sets is metastable.
Proof. Let Sl be a sequence of sets converging to a set S such that for each l there exists
El µ E such that El
0 = f0g£Sl, and El satisﬁes the essentiality and connexity conditions of
Deﬁnition 2.6. For each l, El satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 4.3 and hence we can assume
without loss of generality that El satisﬁes the stronger form of connexity: for all small ± > 0,
El
±n@E± is connected and dense in E±. Since the Sl converge to S, the El
0 converge to E0,
and we can now choose a sequence of ±l’s decreasing to zero such that the El
±l’s converge to
E0 and, for each l, El
±ln@El
1 is connected and dense in El




For each l, let Vl be the projection of E±l to Σ. Then Vln@Σ is connected and dense in
Vl. Also, Vl satisﬁes the Robustness condition of Deﬁnition 2.1 by Theorem 3.7. Finally, the
Vl’s converge to S since in E the sets E±l converge to E0. Thus S is metastable. ¤
It is natural to wonder if the Hausdorﬀ limit of stably essential sets is itself stably essential,
which would then imply the equivalence between metastability and stable essentiality. In
the two theorems above—whose proof techniques were borrowed from Mertens [14, Section
5B] where it is shown that the limit of a sequence of semialgebraic ˇ H-stable sets is itself
ˇ H-stable—we could, like Mertens, use the approximations El to produce a germ E for S
that satisﬁes the connexity requirement of Deﬁnition 2.6. The problem is with the stable
essentiality condition. In the case of ˇ H-stability the fact that ˇ Cech cohomology is weakly
continuous is used to establish the essentiality condition for E. In our case there seems to be
no analogue of the following nature. Suppose (Xl;@Xl) is a decreasing sequence of compact
semialgebraic pairs converging to (X;@X) and suppose there is a sequence of stably essential
maps pl : (Xl;@Xl) ! (B;@B) where for l > 1, pl is the restriction of the map p1 to Xl. Is
it then necessarily the case that the restriction of p1 to X is also stably essential? While weMETASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 25
do not have a counter example, the answer to this question appears to be no. In any event,
the above three theorems readily imply the following compactness result for metastability.
Theorem 4.5. The collection of metastable sets is the Hausdorﬀ closure of the collection of
stably essential sets.
Theorem 4.6. ˇ H-stable sets are stably essential and hence metastable.
Proof. As is shown in Mertens [14, Section 4E] S is ˇ H-stable iﬀ there exists a sequence of
closed d-dimensional semialgebraic subsets El of E, where d is the dimension of P1, such that
for each l, El satisﬁes the essentiality and Robustness condition in Deﬁnition 2.5 and the
sequence El
0 converges to f0g£S. Since El is d-dimensional, using Lemma A.9 we therefore
have that Sl
0 ´ f¾ j (0;¾) 2 El g is stably essential and hence metastable. By Theorem 4.5
S is metastable as well. ¤
The results of this Section show that, as we asserted earlier, the collection of metastable
sets remains the same if we weaken the Robustness condition in Deﬁnition 2.1 to the fol-
lowing: For each k there exists i(k) such that for each i > i(k), and each correspondence
'k £ f : Σ £ Λk ! Σ £ Λk, where 'k is a ±i-perturbation of Rk, there exists a ﬁxed point
in Vi £ Λk. We will merely sketch the arguments here. Given a set S and a collection Vi
converging to S that satisfy this weak robustness property above and all the other properties
in Deﬁnition 2.1, the proof of Lemma 4.1 can be modiﬁed to show that that there exists a
nested collection of W± that satisfy all the conditions of Lemma 4.1 except for the robustness
condition, which now becomes: for each k, there exists ±k > 0 such that for 0 < ± 6 ±k,
and each correspondence 'k £ f : Σ £ Λk ! Σ £ Λk, where 'k is a ±-perturbation of Rk,
there exists a ﬁxed point in W± £ Λk. The proof of the necessity part of Theorem 4.2 can
be used to prove the existence of a a set E, with E0 = f0g£S, that satisﬁes the connexity
condition there and the following essentiality condition: for each k, there exists ±(k) > 0
such that for 0 < ± 6 ±k, the projection qk
± : (F±;@F±) ! (Q±;@Q±) is essential. The proof of
Theorem 4.3 does not require the stable essentiality of q± : (E±;@E±) ! (Q±;@Q±) for some
±, but rather the essentiality for each k of qk
±k for some ±k: indeed, this follows from the fact
the sets El constructed there are semialgebraic, coupled with Lemma 3.11. Thus, S can be
approximated by a sequence of stably essential sets. Finally, Theorem 4.4 shows that S is
indeed metastable in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.1. Thus, it is without loss of generality that
we imposed the seemingly stronger Robustness condition for metastability.26 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
5. Properties of Metastable Sets
Kohlberg and Mertens [10] and Mertens [13, 14, 15] list a basic set of game-theoretic prop-
erties that they argue any reasonable solution concept should satisfy. In this Section we show
that, except for the decomposition property, metastability satisﬁes all their requirements.
Metastability satisﬁes a slightly weaker version of the decomposition property.
5.1. Basic Properties. Since ˇ H-stable sets exist and are metastable, we get existence for
metastability. Also, by deﬁnition, metastable sets are connected sets of perfect equilibria.
Metastable sets are BR-sets and the proof in Hillas [7] then shows that a metastable set
contains a proper equilibrium and thus satisﬁes the backward induction property. Finally,
by Theorem 4.5 the collection of metastable sets is compact in the Hausdorﬀ topology.
5.2. Forward Induction and Iterated Dominance. Kohlberg and Mertens [10] intro-
duce the notion of forward induction by requiring that a solution to the game contain a
solution to a game obtained by deleting a strategy that is not a best reply against any
equilibrium in the solution of the original game. Mertens [13] strengthens this property
by requiring the solution to survive even under deletion of a strategy that, while possibly
optimal against some equilibrium in the solution, is nonetheless inferior in any "-perfect
equilibrium close to the set. Here we prove this property for metastability.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose S is a metastable set of the game G. If there exist a neighborhood
V of S, ± > 0, and a pure strategy sn for some player n such that sn is an inferior reply
against each ¾ 2 V \(Σ±n@Σ), then S contains a metastable set of the game ¯ G obtained by
deleting the pure strategy sn.
If Vi is a sequence as in Deﬁnition 2.1 then for large i, by our assumptions, sn is used with
probability at most ±i at each ¾ 2 Vin@Σ. Hence it is used with zero probability in S. S can
thus be viewed as a subset of the strategy space in ¯ G. And, formally, the theorem states
this subset contains a metastable set in ¯ G.
Proof. Let Vi be a sequence of subsets of Σ converging to S and satisfying the conditions of
Deﬁnition 2.1. Assume that for each i, Vi is a subset of V and ±i 6 ±. By Lemma 4.1, we
can further assume that Vi is semialgebraic and contains S. Let ¯ Σ be the face of Σ where sn
is used with zero probability. We can view ¯ Σ as the strategy space of the game ¯ G obtained
by deleting strategy sn. Since Vi contains S, which as we remarked above is contained in
¯ Σ, ¯ Vi ´ Vi \ ¯ Σ is a closed, nonempty, semialgebraic subset of ¯ Σ and ¯ Vi converges to S. By
Statement (3) of Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 4.4, it is suﬃcient to prove that ¯ Vi satisﬁes the
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The set ¯ P±i of ±i-perturbations for the game ¯ G can be viewed as the face of P±i where the
error probability for sn is zero. Fix k and let ¯ f £ ¯ g : ¯ Σ £ Λk ! Λk £ ¯ P±i be a map. By
Theorem 3.13 it is suﬃcient to show that ¯ 'k
¯ g £ ¯ f has a ﬁxed point in ¯ Vi£Λk. Extend ¯ f £¯ g to
a map f£g from Σ£Λk to ¯ P±i£Λk. Suppose (¾;¸) is a ﬁxed point of 'k
g£f such that ¾ 2 ¯ Vi.
Then obviously it is also a ﬁxed point of ¯ 'k
g £ ¯ f. Hence to ﬁnish the proof we prove the
existence of such a ﬁxed point for 'k
g £ f. Choose a sequence of functions gl : Σ £ Λk ! P±i
converging to g (in the sup norm) such that for each l the image of the map is contained
in P±in@P±i. For each l there exists a ﬁxed point (¾l;¸l) of 'k
gl £ f such that ¾l 2 Vi. Let
´l = gl(¾l;¸l). Since ´l belongs to the interior of P±i and ¾l is a perturbed equilibrium of
G(´l), ¾l is completely mixed. By assumption, therefore, sn is used with probability ´l
n;sn
under ¾l
n. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, the limit (¾;¸), which belongs to Vi£Λk,
is a ﬁxed point of 'g £ f where the probability of sn is zero, i.e. ¾ 2 ¯ Vi. ¤
The proof actually implies a slightly stronger forward induction property. If sn is not a
best reply to any strategy in the sets Vin@Σ then deleting the strategy preserves a metastable
set of the smaller game.
5.3. Ordinality and Player-Splitting. Kohlberg and Mertens [10] require that a solution
is invariant under the addition or deletion of redundant strategies, i.e. a solution depends
only on the reduced strategic form of the game obtained by deleting redundant strategies.
Subsequently Mertens [15] provides a formal treatment of this notion, generalizing the idea to
the concept of ordinality for solution concepts. Here we show that metastability is ordinal in
the sense of Mertens. While Mertens considered the class of strategic-form games—where the
strategy sets of the players are arbitrary polytopes and the payoﬀ functions are multiaﬃne—
we restrict ourselves here to games in normal form with ﬁnite pure strategy sets. Hence our
treatment of ordinality is in the context of normal-form games (even though there is an
obvious extension of metastability to this general class and ordinality obtains there as well).
Mertens [15, Theorem 2] gives two suﬃcient conditions for a solution to be ordinal. The
following two theorems establish that metastability satisﬁes them.
A strategy ¿n is an admissible best reply against a proﬁle ¾ if there exists a sequence ¾k
converging to ¾ such that ¿n is a best reply against ¾k for all k. A proﬁle ¿ is an admissible
best reply against ¾ if for each n, ¿n is an admissible best reply against ¾. One then obtains
an admissible best reply correspondence for the game that assigns to each ¾ the set of
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Theorem 5.2. Suppose G and ˜ G are two games with the same sets of players and strategies,
and they have the same admissible best-reply correspondence. Then they have the same
metastable sets.
Proof. Let S be a metastable set of G and let E be a germ for S satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 4.2. We can assume without loss of generality that E is the closure of En@E1;
indeed, the connexity condition obviously holds if we do so, while the essentiality condition
holds because of Remark A.7. Given ± > 0 and a strategy proﬁle ¿ 2 Σn@Σ, observe that
G(±¿) and ˜ G(±¿) have the same set of equilibria, since G and ˜ G have the same admissible
best-reply correspondence. Therefore, E is also a subset of the graph of the perturbed
equilibrium correspondence for the game ˜ G. Hence, S is a metastable set of the game ˜ G.
The result follows from the symmetry between G and ˜ G. ¤
We now state and prove a theorem that implies that metastability is invariant under
addition of redundant strategies and also shows that the player-splitting property holds.
Before discussing these properties, we present the theorem.
Suppose ˜ G and G are two strategic-form games with strategy spaces ˜ Σ and Σ respectively.
Suppose f is a surjective linear mapping from ˜ Σ to Σ such that for each 0 6 ± 6 1 and ˜ ¿ 2 ˜ Σ,
˜ ¾ is an equilibrium of the perturbed game ˜ G(±˜ ¿) iﬀ f(˜ ¾) is an equilibrium of G(±f(˜ ¿)).
Theorem 5.3. If ˜ S is a metastable set of ˜ G then f(˜ S) is a metastable set of G. If S is a
metastable set of G then f¡1(S) is a metastable set of ˜ G.
The proof uses the following lemma. It is a version of the Generic Local Triviality Theorem
for the case of polyhedra and linear mappings, and because of the formulation it yields a
“global triviality” result.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose f : X ! Y is a surjective linear mapping where X and Y are
compact convex polyhedra, and let d = dim(X) ¡ dim(Y ). There exists a surjective map
h : Y £ [0;1]d ! X such that:
(1) h(fy g £ [0;1]d) = f¡1(y) for all y 2 Y .
(2) h maps (Y n@Y )£(0;1)
d homeomorphically onto (Xn@X), where @X and @Y are the
relative boundaries X and Y , respectively.
Moreover, there exists a continuous selection from f¡1.
Proof of Lemma. The existence of a continuous selection from f¡1 follows from the existence
of the function h with the requisite properties, which we now prove. Let k be the dimension
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suﬃcient to prove the lemma for the special case that f is a projection map onto, say, the
ﬁrst k coordinates.
We can further assume that X is a full-dimensional polyhedron in Rk+d and Y is the
projection of X onto its ﬁrst k-coordinates. Indeed, suppose X is a polyhedron in Rm with
Y being the projection of X onto, say, the ﬁrst k coordinates; then, since X is (k + d)-
dimensional and its projection to the ﬁrst k coordinates is k-dimensional, we can ﬁnd d
additional coordinates such that, after permuting the last m¡k coordinates if necessary, the
projection from X onto the ﬁrst k + d coordinates is a homeomorphism between X and its
image. Thus, replacing X with its projection onto its ﬁrst k +d coordinates, we can assume
that X is a full-dimensional polyhedron in Rk+d and f is the projection of X onto the ﬁrst
k coordinates.
It is now suﬃcient to prove the theorem for the case where d = 1, since, in general, f
can factored through a series of projections that omit one coordinate at a time. For each
y 2 Y , let yk+1(y) (resp. y
k+1(y)) be the maximum (resp. minimum) over yk+1 2 R such that
(y;yk+1) 2 X. Since f : X ! Y is a linear map , f¡1 : Y ! X is a continuous correspondence
and, by the Maximum Theorem, yk+1(y) and y
k+1(y) are continuous functions of y. Since
X is a full-dimensional polyhedron, (y;yk+1(y)) and (y;y
k+1) belong to the boundary of X
for all y 2 Y ; and yk+1(y) > y
k+1(y) with fy g £ (y
k+1(y);yk+1(y)) ½ Xn@X if y belongs to
the interior of Y . Deﬁne now h : Y £[0;1] ! X by h(y;¸) = (y;(1¡¸)y
k+1(y)+¸yk+1(y)).
Then h has the required properties. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Because f is a surjective linear map, f¡1 is a continuous correspon-
dence and therefore by Theorem 4.5 it is suﬃcient to prove the result for a stably essential
set. Also, by Theorem 4.3 we can further assume that the relevant sets have semialgebraic
germs and satisfy the stronger connexity condition given there. For simplicity we call a set
S with such a semialgebraic germ a semialgebraic stably essential set.
For this proof we view E and ˜ E as graphs of equilibria (rather than perturbed equilibria)
of perturbed games for G and ˜ G respectively.
Suppose ˜ S¤ is a semialgebraic stably essential set with a semialgebraic germ ˜ E¤. Let ˜ E be
the set of (˜ ´; ˜ ¾) such that there exists (˜ ´; ˜ ¾0) 2 ˜ E¤ with f(˜ ¾) = f(˜ ¾0). Then ˜ E is semialgebraic
and f¡1(f(˜ S)) = f ˜ ¾ j (0; ˜ ¾) 2 ˜ E g. For each (´;¾0) 2 ˜ E, (´;¸¾0 + (1 ¡ ¸)¾) 2 ˜ E, where
(´;¾) 2 ˜ E¤ and f(¾) = f(¾0). Therefore, ˜ E satisﬁes the connexity condition, since ˜ E¤
does. Obviously ˜ E satisﬁes the essentiality condition since it contains ˜ E¤ which does. Thus
f¡1(f(˜ S)) is a semialgebraic stably essential set as well. Therefore, to prove the theorem30 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
it is suﬃcient to show that S is a semialgebraic stably essential set of G iﬀ f¡1(S) is a
semialgebraic stably essential set in ˜ G.
S is a semialgebraic stably essential set in G iﬀ there exists a semialgebraic subset S of E
satisfying the essentiality condition of Deﬁnition 2.6 and the connexity condition of Theorem
4.3. For a semialgebraic subset E ½ E, let ˜ E = (±˜ ¿; ˜ ¾) 2 ˜ E be such that (±f(˜ ¿);f(˜ ¾)) 2 S.
˜ E is obviously semialgebraic and S = f¾ j (0;¾) 2 E g iﬀ f¡1(S) = f ˜ ¾ j (0; ˜ ¾) 2 ˜ E g. Also
E satisﬁes the connexity condition of Theorem 4.3 iﬀ ˜ E does. Hence, it is suﬃcient to show
that E satisﬁes the essentiality condition of Deﬁnition 2.6 iﬀ ˜ E does too.
Because E and ˜ E are semialgebraic, by Lemma 3.11 it is suﬃcient to prove that E satisﬁes
the essentiality condition of Theorem 4.2 iﬀ ˜ E does. Fix 0 < ± < 1. We show that the
projection q± from F± to Q± is essential iﬀ ˜ q± from ˜ F± to ˜ Q± is. Since Q± and ˜ Q± are
homeomorphic to Σ and ˜ Σ, we view F± and ˜ F± as subsets of Σ £ Σ and ˜ Σ £ ˜ Σ respectively.
Thus F± = (¿;¾) 2 Σ £ Σ is such that (±¿;¾) 2 E± and ˜ F± is the set of (˜ ¿; ˜ ¾) such that
(±˜ ¿; ˜ ¾) belongs to ˜ E± (and therefore (f(˜ ¿);f(˜ ¾)) belongs to F±). We view ˜ q± and q± as the
projection to the ﬁrst factor.
Let k = dim(˜ Σ) ¡ dim(Σ). q± is stably essential iﬀ qk
± : (F±;@F±)£ (Λk;@Λk) ! (Σ;@Σ) £
(Λk;@Λk) is stably essential. Let ¯ F± = (˜ ¿;¾) 2 ˜ Σ £ Σ be such that (f(˜ ¿);¾) 2 F± and let ¯ q±
be the projection from F± to ˜ Σ. By Lemma 5.4 there exists a map h : (Σ;@Σ)£(Λk;@Λk) !
(˜ Σ;@˜ Σ) whose restriction to (Σn@Σ) £ (Λkn@Λk) is a homeomorphism. Therefore, using
Lemma A.5, qk
± is stably essential iﬀ ¯ q± is stably essential.
Observe now that ˜ q± = ¯ q± ± (Id £ f). Therefore, if ˜ q± is stably essential then so is ¯ qd and
hence also q±. On the other hand, suppose q± is stably essential, and so too is ¯ q±. Letting g
be a continuous selection from f¡1, we have that ¯ q± = ˜ q± ± (Id £ g) and hence ˜ q± is stably
essential. Thus we have shown that the essentiality condition for S is equivalent to that for
˜ S. Hence S is a semialgebraic stably essential set iﬀ f¡1(S) is. ¤
This proof shows that if g is a continuous selection from f¡1 then S is a metastable set of
G iﬀ g(S) is. We are unable to ascertain the following stronger version of this property: ˜ S
is metastable iﬀ f(˜ S) is.
The above theorem applies to invariance and player-splitting as follows. Formally, suppose
we have two games ˜ G and G with the same player set. Suppose for each player n, there
exists a surjective linear map fn : ˜ Σn ! Σn such that if f : ˜ Σ ! ¯ Σ is the corresponding
map between the spaces of strategy proﬁles then for each ˜ ¾ 2 Σ the payoﬀs of the players
in ˜ G are their payoﬀs in G from f(˜ ¾). Since f is surjective, we can actually view Σn as a
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˜ G such that fn(˜ sn) = sn. Thus ˜ G is obtained from G by adding redundant strategies. The
above theorem now relates the solutions of G and ˜ G and yields the Invariance property for
metastability.
The player-splitting property states the following. In an extensive-form game, if we can
partition some player’s collection of information sets in such a way that no play of the game
intersects more than one element of the partition, then the solution of the game should be
the same if we consider the agent-normal form where this player has as many agents as there
are elements in the partition. We now formally state this property for metastability.
Suppose one has an N-player extensive-form game in which one can partition some player
n’s collection Hn of information sets into two subcollections Hn1 and Hn2 such that no
information set in one subcollection follows an information set in the other. Let ˜ G be the
strategic form of the game. Consider now a new game G where we ‘split’ player n into two
players n1 and n2, i.e. the player set in G is (Nnfng) [ fn1;n2 g. The strategy sets of the
players other than n in ˜ G are the same as in the two games. Each pure strategy ˜ sn of player
n in ˜ G prescribes actions at each information set in Hni for agent i = 1;2 and thus gives a
pure strategy for player ni in Gn. Let Sni be player ni’s set of pure strategies in G and let
Σni be the corresponding set of mixed strategies. We now describe the payoﬀ functions for
the players. Observe that a pair (sn1;sn2) of pure strategies for the agents deﬁnes uniquely a
pure strategy for player n in ˜ G. Therefore, given a proﬁle of pure strategies in G, the payoﬀs
of the players other than the two agents are the payoﬀs they get from the corresponding
proﬁle in ˜ G; for agent ni let it be n’s payoﬀ if the outcome induced by the proﬁle follows an
information set in Hni and let it be arbitrary otherwise.
For each i there is a well-deﬁned aﬃne function fni from ˜ Σn to Σni that computes for each
˜ ¾n the corresponding marginal distribution over Sni. Let f : ˜ Σ ! Σ be the map f(¾) =
(˜ ¾1;:::; ˜ ¾n¡1;fn1(˜ ¾n);fn2(˜ ¾n); ˜ ¾n+1;:::¾N). Then f satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 5.3
and we get the player-splitting property for metastability, in that it does not matter whether
one treats the two agents as one player.
5.4. The Small Worlds and Decomposition Properties. Suppose ˜ G is an N-equivalent
game. As speciﬁed by Mertens [15] the Small Worlds axiom requires that solutions of G
are precisely the projections of solutions of ˜ G. Given Theorem 3.15, one might expect
metastability to satisfy the Small Worlds axiom. As the following theorem shows, however,
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Theorem 5.5. Let ˜ G be an N-equivalent game. If ˜ S is a metastable set of ˜ G then its
projection to Σ is a metastable set of G. If S is a metastable set of G then it contains a
metastable set that is the projection of a metastable set of ˜ G.
Proof. Let ˜ S be a metastable set of ˜ G. Let ˜ Vi be a sequence of sets satisfying the conditions
in Deﬁnition 2.1. For each i let Vi be the projection of ˜ Vi to Σ. Clearly the Vi’s converge to
the projection, call it S, of ˜ S. Also, the Vi’s satisfy the connexity condition since the ˜ Vi’s
do. Finally, as for the Robustness condition, given a correspondence 'k £ f : Σ £ Λk ! Λk,
where 'k is a ±i-perturbation of Rk, there is an extension ˜ 'k£f : ˜ Σ£Λk ! ˜ Σ£Λk given by:
(˜ 'k £ f)(¾;¾¡N;¸) is the set of (¾0;¾0
¡N;¸0) such that ¾0 2 'k(¾;¸), ¾0
¡N 2 R¡N(¾;¾¡N),
and ¸0 2 f(¾;¸). By the Robustness property for ˜ Vi there exists a ﬁxed point (¾;¾¡N;¸) of
˜ 'k £ f in ˜ Vi. Then (¾;¸) is a ﬁxed point of 'k £ f in Vi, which shows that Vi satisﬁes the
Robustness property and hence that S is metastable.
To prove the second statement, let S be a metastable set of G. Let Vi be a sequence of
sets converging to S and satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.1. By Lemma 4.1 we can
assume that the Vi’s are semialgebraic. Let Σo be the mixed strategy space of the outsiders.
And let ˜ Σ = Σ £ Σo be the mixed strategy space in ˜ G. By the Robustness condition for
metastability of S, for each i, every correspondence ˜ 'k £ f : ˜ Σ £ Λk ! ˜ Σ £ Λk, where ˜ 'k
is a ±i-perturbation of the best-reply correspondence in ˜ G, has a ﬁxed point in Vi £ Σo. As
Vi£Σ0 is semialgebraic, by Theorem 3.8 it contains a stably essential set ˜ Si. By going to an
appropriate subsequence, we have that S £ Σ0 contains a metastable set. By the ﬁrst part
of this theorem, its projection onto Σ is a metastable set of G, which is obviously contained
in S. ¤
As shown in [15] the collection of q-stable sets (deﬁned in [14]) satisfy the stronger form
of the Small Worlds property, namely that they are precisely the projections of q-stable sets
of N-equivalent games. Since q-stable sets are metastable as well, it would be interesting to
know if the collection of metastable sets that satisfy the stronger property for metastability
is exactly the collection of q-stable sets.
A property related to the Small Worlds axiom is the Decomposition Property, which states
the following. Suppose G1 and G2 are two games played by two sets of players in two diﬀerent
rooms. Suppose G is the composite game G1 £ G2. Then: (D1) the solutions of G project
to solutions of G1 and G2; and, (D2) the product of solutions to G1 and G2 are solutions
to G. Property (D1) is implied by Theorem 5.5 and hence metastability satisﬁes it. As for
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Theorem 5.6. Let S1 be a metastable set of G1. There exists a metastable set S2 of G2
such that S1 £ S2 is metastable in G1 £ G2.
Proof. By the compactness property for metastability we can assume that S1 is stably es-
sential. Moreover, by Theorem 4.3 we can assume that S1 has a semialgebraic germ E1:
S1 = f¾1 2 Σ1 j (0;¾) 2 E1g; and there exists ±1 > 0 such that for each 0 < ± 6 ±1 E1
±n@E1
±
is connected and dense in E± and the projection from E1
± is stably essential.
Let E = (´1;´2;¾1;¾2) 2 E such that (´1;¾1) 2 E1. E is a closed semialgebraic set. For
each 0 < ± 6 ±0, we claim that p : (E±;@E±) ! (P±;@P±) is stably essential. To see this, for
each 0 < ± < ±1, let V± be the projection of E± onto Σ1. Then, by Theorem 3.7, V± satisﬁes
the robustness condition in the deﬁnition of metastability. In particular, for each 0 < ± 6 ±1,
and for each k, each correspondence '£f : Σ£Λk ! Σ£Λk where ' is a ±-perturbation of
R has a ﬁxed point in V± £Σ2. By Theorem 3.8, p : (E±;@E±) ! (P±;@P±) is stably essential
as claimed.
Let X be the closure of the set of En@E1. Then X is a semialgebraic set as well and by
Lemma A.7 the projection from X± is stably essential for each 0 < ± 6 ±0. By [15, Lemma
2] there exists ±0 > 0, a positive integer k, for each k a semialgebraic set Xk such that for
each 0 < ± 6 ±0: (i) Xk
±n@X± is connected and dense in Xk
± for each k; Xk
± \ Xl
± µ @X1
for k 6= l; (iii) [kXk
d = X±. Without loss of generality we can assume that ±0 6 ±1.
The stable essentiality of the projection from X± along with properties (ii) and (iii) imply
that there exists k such that the projection from Xk
± is stably essential. Let Y = Xk. Y
satisﬁes the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.6 and the set S given by the projection of Y0 onto
Σ is stably essential set. Let S2 be the projection of S onto Σ2. We will now show that
that S = S1 £ S2. In conjunction with decomposition property (D1) this then proves the
result. Choose ¾2 2 S2. There exists ¾1 2 S1 such that ¾ ´ (¾1;¾2) 2 S. Because Y±0n@Y±0
is a semialgebraic set that is connected and dense in Y±0, (0;¾) = lim±!0(´(±);¾(±)) for
some path (´(±);¾(±)) in Y±0n@Y±0. If ˜ ¾1 is another strategy in S1, then by the connexity
for property for the semialgebraic set E1, there (0; ˜ ¾1) = lim±!0(˜ ´1(±); ˜ ¾1(±)) for a path in
E1n@E1. Therefore, (˜ ´1(±);´(±); ˜ ¾1(±);¾2(±)) is a path in Xn@X1 whose limit is (0; ˜ ¾1;¾2).
Moreover because E1 satisﬁes the connexity property, it is clear that this path belongs to
Y . Thus (˜ ¾1;¾2) belongs to S. Since ˜ ¾2 was an arbitrary strategy in S2, we thus have that
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6. Concluding Remarks
The reﬁnements deﬁned in x2 diﬀer chieﬂy in the formulation of the corresponding version
of robustness. As Hillas et al. [8] show, homotopy stability is more restrictive than BR-
stability because homotopic essentiality invokes a richer class of perturbations. Stable essen-
tiality is an even stronger requirement because it invokes the Embedding principle, including
the axioms of Invariance and the projection property of Small Worlds. (Co)homological es-
sentiality is evidently the strongest criterion—and importantly, unlike homotopy criteria it
ensures that essential maps are surjective. It is this diﬀerence that accounts for the slightly
weaker form (compared to Mertens’ reﬁnement) of the Small Worlds property established
in Theorem 5.5, and the possible failure of metastability to satisfy (D2) of the Decomposi-
tion property. However, we show in [5] that this diﬀerence occurs only for a game whose
extensive-form has nongeneric payoﬀs.
For the foundations of game theory, the development of a canonical reﬁnement of Nash
equilibria requires one to choose among these topological criteria. This choice must ulti-
mately be guided by decision-theoretic criteria. The results in this paper imply that the
weakest topological criterion that preserves the standard list of decision-theoretic axioms is
stable essentiality. Our exposition is cast diﬀerently in that we begin straightaway with the
deﬁnition of metastability and its motivation in terms of the principles of Embedding and
Robustness, and then establish that this deﬁnition is equivalent to stable essentiality of the
projection map from the equilibrium graph. But this is the crux of the matter technically.
Our view is that metastability is a viable substitute for Mertens’ reﬁnements based on
(co)homological essentiality of the projection map, since metastability yields basically the
same decision-theoretic properties. From a computational viewpoint, the test for metasta-
bility (stable essentiality) is more diﬃcult to apply. It advantage in applications may there-
fore lie in its conceptual justiﬁcation and its agreement with Mertens’ stability in generic
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Appendix A. Mathematical Background
We ﬁrst study some properties of a map whose range is homeomorphic to a ball. Through-
out, let (X;@X) be a compact pair and let (B;@B) be homeomorphic to a ball with its bound-
ary. (We are not assuming here that @X is the boundary of X.) A map f : (X;@X) !
(B;@B) is essential in homotopy if it is not homotopic relative to @X to a map to @B.
Mertens [14, Section 4E, Lemma 2] proves the following equivalent characterizations of
inessentiality.
Lemma A.1. The following statements are equivalent.
² f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) is inessential in homotopy.
² There exists a map g : X ! @B that agrees with f on @X.
² There exists a map g : X ! @B such that the restrictions of f and g to @X are freely
homotopic.
The following Lemma shows that a map that is essential in homotopy has strong ﬁxed-
point properties.
Lemma A.2. Let f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) be a map that is essential in homotopy. Then
every function g : X ! B has a point of coincidence with f, i.e. there exists x 2 X such
that f(x) = g(x). Moreover, if X is metrizable and B is convex then every correspondence
' : X ! B has a point of coincidence with f.
Proof. Suppose there exists g : X ! B that has no point of coincidence with f. Viewing
B as a ball, deﬁne a map h : X ! @B as follows: for each x 2 X, h(x) is the unique
point in @B that is closer to f(x) than g(x) on the line from g(x) through f(x). Clearly h
coincides with f on @X and hence f is inessential. Assume now the additional hypotheses
of the second statement. Using McLennan [12, Proposition 2.25], for each " > 0 there exists
a function g" : X ! Y whose graph is within " of the graph of '. By what we have proved,
each g" has a point x" such that f(x") = g"(x"). Let x be the limit of a convergent sequence
of x" as " goes to zero. Then x is a point of coincidence between f and '. ¤
As the following Lemma shows, the above coincidence property completely characterizes
the essentiality of f in some cases.
Lemma A.3. Suppose f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) is such that f(Xn@X) µ Bn@B. If f is
inessential then there exists a map g : X ! B with no point of coincidence with f.
Proof. There is no loss of generality in assuming that B is the unit ball in a Euclidean space.
Suppose f is inessential. Then there exists a map g : X ! @B that agrees with f on @X.36 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Deﬁne h : X ! B by letting h(x) be the “antipode” of g(x) in B, i.e. h(x) = ¡g(x). Clearly,
f has no point of coincidence with h. ¤
Remark A.4. Let Y be the closure of Xn@X and let @Y = Y n(Xn@X). Given f :
(X;@X) ! (B;@B), deﬁne g be the restriction of f to Y . If f is inessential then so is
g. On the other hand, any map h : Y ! @B that agrees with g on @Y extends to a map
over X by letting it agree with f on XnY . Hence if g is inessential then f is too. Thus
essentiality of f and g are equivalent.
We are often interested in quotient spaces X0 and B0 of X and B obtained by identifying
some points in @X and @B, respectively, in such a way that the map f induces a map f0
from X0 to B0. Under some conditions, the essentiality of f is equivalent to the essentiality
of f0. Formally, for Y = X;B, suppose qY : (Y;@Y ) ! (Y 0;@Y 0) is a surjective closed map
that sends Y n@Y homeomorphically onto Y 0n@Y 0. (Since Y and Y 0 are compact, if Y 0 is
Hausdorﬀ—as it will be in all our intended applications—every surjective map from Y to Y 0
is a closed map.) Furthermore, suppose that (B0;@B0) is homeomorphic to a ball pair. Let
f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) and f0(X0;@X0) ! (B0;@B0) be two maps such that: f0±qX = qB ±f
and f0(X0n@X0) µ B0n@B0.
Lemma A.5. f is essential in homotopy iﬀ f0 is.
Proof. Suppose f is inessential. Let g : X ! @B be a map that agrees with f on @X.
Deﬁne g0 : X0 ! @B0 by g0(x0) = qB(g(q
¡1
X (x0))). Obviously, g0(x0) is a singleton set for
x0 2 X0n@X0. For x0 2 @X0, q
¡1
X (x0) µ @X. Therefore, qB(g(q
¡1





X (x0))) = f0(x0). Thus, g0 is single-valued and coincides with f0 on @X0. Finally,
continuity of g0 follows from the fact that qX is a closed map and from the continuity of qB
and g. Consequently, f0 is inessential.
Suppose f0 is inessential. By Lemma A.3 there exists a map g0 : X0 ! B0 that does
not have a point of coincidence with f0. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
g0(X) µ B0n@B0. (Indeed, viewing B0 as a ball, for a ﬁxed b0 2 B0n@B0, the map sending
x0 to (1 ¡ ±)g0(x0) + ±b0 has no point of coincidence with f0 for suﬃciently small ± > 0 and
has all its values in B0n@B0.) Then, the map q
¡1
B ±g0 ±qX is well-deﬁned and has no point of
coincidence with f. Thus f is inessential. ¤
A.1. Extension of Maps to Suspensions. The (unreduced) suspension SX of X is de-
ﬁned as the quotient space of X £ [0;1] obtained by identifying X £ f0g to a point and
X £ f1g to another point. One then deﬁnes the k-th suspension SkX of X inductively as
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Given the pair (X;@X), S@X can be viewed as a subset of SX if for i = 0;1, we identify
the “point” @X £fig with X £fig—thus S@X is the set @X £(0;1) along with the points
X£fig for i = 0;1. One again deﬁnes the k-th suspension Sk(X;@X) of (X;@X) as follows:
S0(X;@X) = (X;@X) and Sk(X;@X) = SSk(X;@X) for each k > 0. For example, if B is
n-dimensional then SB is an (n + 1)-ball and S@B is an n-sphere. Thus, S(B;@B) is an
(n + 1)-ball pair.
Given a map f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B), one deﬁnes its extension Sf : S(X;@X) ! S(B;@B)
to the suspensions of its domain and range as follows: Sf(x;t) = (f(x);t) for (x;t) 2
X £ (0;1), and Sf(X £ fig) = B £ fig for i = 0;1. Then one deﬁnes inductively the map
Skf : Sk(X;@X) ! Sk(B;@B) as follows: S0f = f and Skf = SSk¡1f for each k > 0.
Lemma A.6. Let f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) be such that f(Xn@X) µ Bn@B. For k > 0,
let (Bk;@Bk) be a pair that is homeomorphic to the k-ball pair and let fk : (X;@X) £
(Bk;@Bk) ! (B;@B) £ (Bk;@Bk) be the function fk(x;bk) = (f(x);bk). Then Skf is
essential iﬀ fk is.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to prove the Lemma for the case (Bk;@Bk) = ([0;1]k;@[0;1]k). Since
f(Xn@X) µ Bn@B, we have that Skf(SkXnSk@X) µ SkBnSk@B. SkX is a quotient space
of Sk¡1X £[0;1] and therefore, by Lemma A.5, Skf is essential iﬀ (Sk¡1f)1 : Sk¡1(X;@X)£
([0;1];f0;1g) ! Sk¡1(B;@B) £ ([0;1];f0;1g) given by (Sk¡1f)1(x0;t) = (Sk¡1f(x0);t)
is essential. Again, using the same Lemma, (Sk¡1f)1 is essential iﬀ the map (Sk¡2f)2 :
Sk¡2(X;@X)£([0;1]2;@[0;1]2) ! Sk¡2(B;@B)£([0;1]2;@[0;1]2) given by (Sk¡2f)2(x0;t1;t2) =
(Sk¡1f(x0);t1;t2) is essential. Continuing this downward induction yields the result since
(S0f)k is the map fk. ¤
Remark A.7. The property in Remark A.4 obviously extends to suspensions of f and g as
well—a fact that we use later.
Deﬁnition A.8 (stably essential). A map f is stably essential if for each k, Skf is essential
in homotopy.
For each k > 0, if Skf is essential in homotopy then so is Sk¡1f. The converse is not
true in general—see for instance [14, Section 4F]—but the following Lemma gives a suﬃcient
condition.
Lemma A.9. Let (X;@X) be a CW complex that has the same dimension as (B;@B). If
f : (X;@X) ! (B;@B) is essential then it is stably essential.
Proof. For k > 0, suppose the k-th suspension Skf of f is essential. We show that Sk+1f
is essential. (Recall that f0 = f.) Sk(X;@X) is obviously a CW complex. Also, if n is38 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
the dimension of B then k + n is the dimension of SkX and SkB. Let (Y;y0) be the space
obtained from SkX by collapsing Sk@X to a point y0. Likewise let (C;c0) be the space
obtained by collapsing Sk@B to a point c0. Let g : (Y;y0) ! (C;c0) be the map induced by
Skf. By Mertens [14, Section 4.E, Theorem], because Sk is essential, g is not homotopic to
the constant map that sends every y 2 Y to c0.
Let (Y1;y1) be the quotient space of S(Y;y0) obtained by collapsing Sy0 to a point, i.e.
the quotient space of Y £ [0;1] obtained by collapsing (Y £ 0) [ (Y £ 1) [ (y0 £ [0;1]) to a
point y1. Likewise let (C1;c1) be the space obtained from (C;c0). Let g1 : (Y1;y1) ! (C1;c1)
be the map induced by the suspension Sg of g. By Spanier [16, Suspension Theorem 8.5.11],
since g is not homotopic to the constant map sending points to c0, g1 is also not homotopic
to the constant that sends every y 2 Y1 to c1. Obviously (Y1;y1) is the quotient space of
the (k + n + 1)-dimensional CW complex Sk+1(X;@X) obtained by collapsing Sk+1@X to a
point y1. The same is true of (C1;c1). Hence we can again apply Mertens [14, Section 4.E,
Theorem] to conclude that Sk+1f is essential. ¤
If the dimension of (X;@X) is smaller than the dimension of (B;@B) then the map f is
not even surjective, so it is inessential in homotopy. It is when X has higher dimension than
B that stable essentiality is possibly stronger than essentiality.
Appendix B. Multisimplicial and Polyhedral Complexes
B.1. Multisimplicial Complexes. The material of this subsection is based on [4, Appen-
dix B]. We refer the reader to that article for a proof of the multisimplicial approximation
theorem stated below.
A set of points fv0;:::;vn g in RN is aﬃnely independent if the equations
Pn
i=0 ¸ivi = 0
and
P
i ¸i = 0 imply that ¸0 = ¢¢¢ = ¸n = 0. An n-simplex K in RN is the convex hull of an
aﬃnely independent set fv0;:::;vn g. Each vi is a vertex of K and the collection of vertices
is called the vertex set of K. Each ¾ 2 K is expressible as a unique convex combination
P
i ¸ivi; and for each i, ¾(vi) ´ ¸i is the vi-th barycentric coordinate of ¾. A face of K is
the convex hull of a nonempty subset of the vertex set of K.
A (ﬁnite) simplicial complex K is a ﬁnite collection of simplices such that the face of each
simplex in K belongs to K, and the intersection of two simplices is either empty or a face of
each. The set V of 0-dimensional simplices is called the vertex set of K. The set given by
the union of the simplices in K is called the space of the simplicial complex and is denoted
jKj. For each ¾ 2 jKj, there exists a unique simplex K of K containing ¾ in its interior;
deﬁne the barycentric coordinate function ¾ : V ! [0;1] by letting ¾(v) = 0 if v is not aMETASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 39
vertex of K and otherwise by letting ¾(v) be the corresponding barycentric coordinate of ¾
in the simplex K.
A subdivision of a simplicial complex K is a simplicial complex K¤ such that each simplex
of K¤ is contained in a simplex of K and each simplex of K is the union of simplices in K¤.
Obviously jKj = jK¤j.
A multisimplex is a set of the form K1 £ ¢¢¢Km, where for each i, Ki is a simplex. A
multisimplicial complex K is a product K1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Km, where for each i, Ki is a simplicial
complex. (The vertex set V of a multisimplicial complex K is the set of all (v1;:::;vm) for
which for each i, vi is a vertex of Ki. The space of the multisimplicial complex is
Q
i jKij and




i where for each i, K¤
i is a subdivision of Ki. In the following, K = K1 £¢¢¢Kn is
a ﬁxed multisimplicial complex and L is a ﬁxed multisimplicial complexes.
Deﬁnition B.1 (cellular map). A map f : jKj ! jLj is called multisimplicial if for each
multisimplex K of K there exists a simplex L in L such that:
(1) f maps each vertex of K to a vertex of L;





By Property 1 of the Deﬁnition, vertices of K are mapped to vertices of L. Therefore, for
each ¾ 2 jKj, f(¾) is an average of the values at the vertices of K. Since the simplex L is a
convex set, the image of the multisimplex K is contained in L. If K is a simplicial complex,
then Deﬁnition B.1 coincides with the usual deﬁnition of a simplicial map. In this case the
image of a multisimplex K under f is a simplex of L, but in the multilinear case the image
of K could be a strict subset of L.
Deﬁnition B.2 (multisimplicial map). Let g : jKj ! jLj be a map. A multisimplicial map
f : jKj ! jLj is a multisimplicial approximation to f if for each ¾ 2 jKj, f(¾) belongs to the
simplex that contains g(¾) in its interior.
We could equivalently deﬁne a multisimplicial approximation by requiring that for each
¾, and each simplex L of L, g(¾) 2 L =) f(¾) 2 L. The following theorem is the
multisimplicial version of the simplicial approximation theorem.
Theorem B.3. Let g : jKj ! jLj be a map. There exists ´ > 0 such that for each subdivision
K¤ of K with the property that the diameter of each multisimplex is at most ´, there exists
a multisimplicial approximation f : jK¤j ! jLj of g.
B.2. Polyhedral Complexes. A polyhedral complex P is a ﬁnite collection of polyhedra
such that: (i) each face of a polyhedron in P belongs to P; and (ii) the intersection of two40 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
polyhedra in P is either empty or a face of each of them. The union of the polyhedra in P
is the space of the polyhedral complex and denoted jPj. Every multisimplicial complex, for
example, is a polyhedral complex where the polyhedra are the multisimplices.
A polyhedral complex P0 is a polyhedral subdivision of P if each polyhedron in P0 is
contained in a polyhedron of P and each polyhedron in P is the union of polyhedra in P0.
The following Lemma is the basis for deﬁning Player 0’s payoﬀ function in Step 2 of the
proof of Claim equivalent game.
Theorem B.4. Let P be a polyhedral complex such that jPj is d-dimensional polyhedron
in Rn. There exists a polyhedral subdivision P0 of P and a convex, piecewise-aﬃne function
° : jPj ! R such that the maximal convex domains on which ° is aﬃne are the d-dimensional
polyhedra in P0.
Proof. The polyhedral complex P0 is derived from P as follows (Eaves and Lemke, 1981).
Let P1 be the set of all (d ¡ 1)-dimensional polyhedra in P. For each polyhedron P 2 P1,
let HP = fz 2 Rn j a0
Pz = bP g be the hyperplane that includes P, and if d < n is
orthogonal to jPj. Let P0
0 be the set of all polyhedra of the form jPj\[\P2P1Hi
P] where each




P are the two closed half spaces whose intersection is HP. P 0
0 is a
collection of d-dimensional polyhedra whose union is jPj. Let P0 be the polyhedral complex
consisting of all the polyhedra that are faces of some polyhedron in P0
0. By construction,




P¾ ¡ bPj. Then ° is convex and piecewise aﬃne. Moreover, the maximal
convex domains on which ° is aﬃne are the polyhedra in P 0
0, which are the d-dimensional
polyhedra of P0. ¤METASTABLE EQUILIBRIA 41
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